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ABSTRACT 
 
THE ROLE OF NEOCONSERVATIVE IDEAS 
IN THE SECURITY POLICIES OF  
THE FIRST GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
Çelik, Arif 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Tore Fougner 
 
September 2005 
 
This thesis attempts to make a contribution to the debate on the role played by 
neoconservative ideas in the first George Walker Bush Administration’s (2000-2004) 
foreign and security policies. While supporting the view that such ideas have had a 
significant impact on the policies in question, the thesis moves beyond a simplistic 
cause-effect analysis of the relationship between ideas and policy to a concern with 
the greater complexity involved in the transformation of neoconservative ideas into 
US foreign and security policies. More specifically, and based on a constructivist 
analytical framework emphasizing the interactive relationship between ideas and 
material circumstances, the thesis draws attention to the crucial role played by 
September 11 terrorist attacks in paving the way for a neoconservative influence on 
US foreign and security policies. Through its focus on the interactive relationship 
between neoconservative ideas and various material circumstances, the thesis 
provides an improved account of how these ideas came to influence US foreign and 
security policies. 
 
Keywords: Neoconservative Ideas, George W. Bush, Foreign and Security Policies, 
Constructivism, September 11, Material Circumstances. 
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ÖZET 
 
İLK GEORGE W. BUSH YÖNETİMİNİN GÜVENLİK POLİTİKALARINDA 
YENİ-MUHAFAZAKAR FİKİRLERİN ROLÜ 
Çelik, Arif 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Assist. Prof. Tore Fougner 
 
Eylül 2005 
 
 Bu çalışma, ilk George Walker Bush Yönetimi’nin dış ve güvenlik 
politikalarının belirlenmesinde, bu Yönetimin üst kadrolarında yeralan yeni-
muhafazakarların rolü konusundaki akademik tartışmalara bir katkı sağlamak 
amacını gütmektedir. Yeni-muhafazakar fikirlerin, Bush Yönetimi’nin 11 Eylül 
sonrası güvenlik politikaları üzerinde önemli oranda etkili olduğunu savunan bu 
çalışma, fikir ve politika arasında basit bir sebep sonuç ilişkisi kurmanın ötesine 
geçerek, sözkonusu fikirlerin politikaya dönüşüm sürecinin karmaşık yapısına 
dikkatleri çekmektedir. Siyasi sonuçların (political outcome) fikirler (ideas) ile 
çevremizdeki materyal dünyanın (material circumstances) karşılıklı etkileşimi 
sonucu ortaya çıktığını savunan Konstrüktivist (Constructivist) bir yaklaşımla 
konuyu inceleyen bu çalışma, yeni-muhafazakar fikirlerin dış ve güvenlik 
politikalarına dönüşme sürecinde 11 Eylül 2001 terörist saldırılarının önemini 
vurgulamaktadır. Fikir ve politika arasındaki karşılıklı etkileşime odaklanmasıyla bu 
çalışma, yeni-muhafazakar fikirlerin ABD dış ve güvenlik politikalarını nasıl 
etkilediğine dair önemli bir perspektif sunmaktadır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Yeni-Muhafazakar Fikirler, George W. Bush, Dış ve Güvenlik 
Politikaları, Konstrüktivizm, 11 Eylül, Materyal Şartlar. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This thesis attempts to make a contribution to the debate on the role played by 
neoconservative ideas in the security policies of the first George W. Bush 
Administration (2000-2004). Taking the significant impact of neoconservative ideas 
on the policies in question for granted, the thesis moves beyond a simplistic cause-
effect analysis of the relationship between ideas and policies to a concern with the 
greater complexity involved in the transformation of neoconservative ideas into US 
foreign and security policies.1 Based on an analytical framework emphasizing the 
complex interaction between ideas and material circumstances, the thesis draws 
attention to the crucial role played by September 11 in paving the way for a 
neoconservative influence on US foreign and security policies. Through its focus on 
the interactive relationship between neoconservative ideas and various material 
circumstances, this thesis provides an improved account of how the neoconservative 
ideas came to influence US foreign and security policies.  
                                                 
1 It is difficult to draw a certain line between foreign and security policies. Therefore, although there 
are conceptual differences between ‘foreign’ and ‘security’ policies, of which the former involves the 
latter conceptually, the terms ‘foreign policy’ and ‘security policy’ will be used interchangeably 
throughout the thesis as it has become a common usage. For an analysis on the vague distinction 
between foreign and security policies see Waever (1995). 
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 By demonstrating that post-September 11 US security policies, to a great 
extent, accord with the formulation of long-lasting neoconservative foreign policy 
suggestions for the US, this thesis argues that neoconservative ideas played a 
significant role in shaping the Bush Administration’s security policies only after  
September 11's terrorist attacks. While September 11, as a material factor in its own 
right, played the role of a stimulus for policy change, neoconservative ideas have 
been largely effective in determining which types of new policies would replace the 
old ones.  
 September 11's terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC) and 
Pentagon provoked the Bush Administration's2 aggressive posture on foreign policy. 
Alleging that the Taliban harbored terrorists, the US's immediate counter-attack on 
Afghanistan and its later offensive against Iraq, precipitated a debate in the media as 
well as in academic circles.  The object of such discussion was provision of 
meaningful expressions as to the causes and implications of these ‘distinct’ foreign 
and security policies pursued by the US.3
 The influence of what has been called “neoconservatism” on US foreign and 
security policies became a significant focus of attention during these debates.  
According to Patricia Greve, two interpretations of the neoconservative role in these 
debates predominated: one positing that a smart and powerful neoconservative clique 
had taken “over the American political system in a coup-like fashion,” leading the 
US to wage two wars in two years, and the other proposing that “neoconservative 
ideas had carried the day with the only justifiable antiterrorism strategic response to 
September 11” (Greve, 2004).  
                                                 
2 Unless otherwise is mentioned, the phrase “Bush Administration” will refer to the first George W. 
Bush Administration throughout the thesis.  
3 Daalder and Lindsay (2003b) term these “distinct” policies of George W. Bush as a “revolution” in 
foreign policy. 
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 Greve approves neither of these interpretations, arguing that the first 
interpretation can be labeled as a conspiracy theory that not only fails to “explain in 
what manner neoconservative ideas and actors became important,” but that also 
“draws conclusions about the direct influence of neoconservatives from their mere 
presence in the Bush Administration.” She further argues that the second 
interpretation “is apologetic and similarly one dimensional,” serving as a justification 
for the wars waged despite the strong opposition of the international community 
(Greve, 2004). 
 The proponents of the first argument are right when they cite empirical 
evidence that the individuals with a neoconservative conviction - who have 
advocated a reorganization of the Middle East since the beginning of 1990s - have 
been inside the Bush Administration as well as in the media and think tanks in the 
US. However, their argument ignores the fact that the neoconservatives have been 
only a part of the heterogeneous circles in the Administration, where the strategic 
and political discussions about security-related decisions take place. Thus taking this 
neoconservative influence during this Administration for granted, it is perhaps more 
remarkable to note that they could not realize many of their policy proposals during 
the George W. Bush Presidency prior to September 11. Neocons4 became effective 
after September 11, which made top Bush officials feel the need to reconsider their 
foreign policy paradigms. September 11 gave the neocons - undeniably a well-
prepared intellectual community, with a successful articulation of their policy 
proposals for decades - an opportunity to guide the US foreign policy. Therefore 
September 11, with its political and psychological effects regarding the internal state 
                                                 
4 As it has become a common usage in the literature, the terms “neocon” and “neoconservative” will 
be used interchangeably in the remaining parts of the thesis. 
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of the US as well as the international conjuncture, paved the way for neocons to 
influence the Bush Administration’s foreign and security policies.  
 In the first chapter of this thesis, a constructivist framework of analysis is 
established, with a clarification of its position within the International Relations (IR) 
discipline. This chapter discusses the significance of ideas in political explanation 
firstly. The literatures of Security Studies and Foreign Policy Analysis are then 
outlined with specific reference to works concerning ideas prepared under the 
frameworks of these literatures. After establishing an analytical framework for a 
constructivist analysis emphasizing the interactive relationship of ideas and material 
circumstances in the production of political outcomes, the chapter continues with a 
discussion on the application of its framework to the case it handles: the role of 
neoconservative ideas in the Bush Administration’s security policies.  
 Neoconservatism is introduced in the second chapter, which identifies 
neoconservatives as an ideological cohort with parts of its network in think tanks, 
media and politics. The identification of the neoconservative ideology, its origins, 
intellectual background, institutions and publications, is also located in the second 
chapter. This chapter further introduces the people in the Bush Administration 
known by their neoconservative convictions, and outlines what they had prepared as 
foreign policy proposals prior to the Presidency of George W. Bush.  
 Chapter Three addresses the context of decision-making in the US with 
reference to key foreign policy officials of the Bush Administration. By outlining the 
foreign policy apparatus and also ideological traditions operating in the US and 
introducing the foreign policy ideas of top Bush officials all of whom influence 
foreign and security policy decisions, this chapter emphasizes that the 
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neoconservative presence in the Bush Administration did not guarantee their 
influence on the formulation of US security policies.  
 Chapter Four investigates the neoconservative influence on US security 
policies before and after September 11, discovering a high level of consistency 
between US security policies after September 11 and long-lasting neoconservative 
policy proposals. Trying to find an answer to the question of how US foreign and 
security policies came to conform to neoconservative prescriptions, within the 
context of which the role of September 11 - with its political and psychological 
effects both internally and externally - comes to be the focus of attention; the chapter 
argues that other than the role of neoconservative ideas, also September 11 had a 
remarkable role on the shaping of Bush Administration’s post-September 11 security 
policies.   
 The concluding chapter of this thesis offers a summary of the study and argues 
that it provides a better account of how neocon ideas came to influence US foreign 
and security policies. It also addresses some additional factors that helped shape 
post-September 11 US security policies, besides neocon ideas and 9/11.5 Perceived 
as an ongoing problem in itself for the US, the first of these factors was Iraq. A 
second factor was the domestic political coalition of which neoconservative actors 
became a part.  Neocons shared several views with aggressive realists like Cheney 
and Rumsfeld, including skepticism about the effectiveness of international 
institutions, treaties and diplomacy. And this sharing of ideas facilitated the 
transcription of neoconservative prescriptions into policies after 9/11. A third factor 
was Bush’s domestic political considerations, which might have informed his 
decision to adopt a radical posture in foreign policy.  
                                                 
5 As it is also a common usage, the phrase “9/11” will be used interchangeably with the phrase 
“September 11” in order to refer the terrorist attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 
 
This chapter outlines the analytical framework informing this thesis and discusses 
this framework in relation to the specific case being analyzed – namely, the role of 
neoconservative ideas in George W. Bush’s security policies. Accordingly, the 
chapter begins with a consideration of the importance of ideas in political 
explanation. Before outlining its analytical framework, however, the thesis firstly 
reviews different theoretical views regarding the role of ideas in political outcomes. 
These views are classified under three titles: idealism, materialism and 
constructivism. The chapter further reviews literatures on Security Studies and 
Foreign Policy Analysis, with specific reference to works concerning ideas published 
under the context of these literatures. Knowledge of both literatures is crucial to this 
thesis, as the decision-making process of US security policies are analyzed 
throughout. Pursuant to surveying relevant literatures, the chapter then explains its 
constructivist approach as one that considers political outcomes as products of a 
complex interaction of material and ideational factors. The chapter concludes with a 
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discussion on the application of this analytical framework with respect to the specific 
case analyzed.   
 
1.1. IDEAS MATTER 
“How many divisions has the pope?” was Stalin’s mocking question to hint at what 
he considered the power of ideas apart from the tools of force (Brands, 2003:1). 
Ironically the dissolution of Stalin’s country came by a couple of ideas: perestroika 
and glastnost (Farrell, 2002: 71).6 Although ideas are not independent factors to 
shape social and political life, political scientists have only relatively recently 
afforded them the role they deserve. Although material force is the “final arbiter of 
international affairs,” ideas are, according to H. W. Brands, the “trigger of force, 
governor of force, and the measure of whether force has accomplished what its 
authors desire” (Brands, 2003: 1). As Brands further summarizes, “Force may be 
how international affairs are waged; ideas are why” (Brands, 2003:1). 
 Ideas should be accorded a crucial role in political explanation, since “ideas 
provide the point of mediation between actors and their environment” (Hay, 2002: 
209-210). Actors behave the way they do because they hold certain assumptions and 
views about the social and political environment in which they find themselves. In 
other words, the ideas actors hold about the contexts they inhabit are crucial to the 
way they act; and, hence, to political outcomes. This suggests an important role for 
ideational factors in political analysis. 
   Political ideas are of importance also for the definition of interests. Definition 
of interests is a very significant determining factor for the nature of policies actors 
choose to implement. And those interests are both socially constructed and value 
                                                 
6 For the importance of ideas for the dissolution of the Soviet Union, see Checkel (1993) and 
Mendelson (1993). See also Brands (2003:1).  
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laden. Ideas matter because they serve policy makers as ‘road maps’ for action, 
supplying them with insights into which policies will beget which conclusions 
(Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 16). Max Weber emphasizes this relationship 
metaphorically: like switchmen at the railway junctions, ideas have determined the 
tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest (Hall, 1993: 
48). 
  
1.2. THE ROLE OF IDEATIONAL FACTORS IN POLITICAL 
EXPLANATION 
The role of ideas in social and political life has been a highly contested issue for a 
long time.7 The main reason for this lengthy debate is participants’ underlying 
attributions of various degrees of importance to the ideational versus material 
dimensions of the world we live in. The role attributed to ideas in political analysis 
varies from one analytical approach to another, reflecting deep-rooted assumptions 
about, among others, the role of theory, the value of parsimony and the status of  
knowledge claims political analysts make. An overview of various positions on the 
role of ideas in determining political outcomes will help this chapter identify its 
analytical framework, as the underlying assumptions of the thesis will be clarified 
towards the end of this chapter.  
 What lies at the core of the debate among the principal positions regarding the 
role of ideas in political analysis, is the question of whether ideas should be accorded 
a causal role independent of material factors.  Thus framed, the debate distinguishes 
between three main positions: idealism, materialism and constructivism (see Figure 
1).  
                                                 
7 In this part, this dissertation to a great extent benefitted from the excellent overview of the issue by 
Hay (2002). 
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 As summarized in Figure 1, the first of these positions is that adopted by 
contemporary idealists – postmodernists, deconstructivists, interpretivists, 
hermeneuticists and poststructural discourse analysts.  Idealism posits that no 
relationship between the material realm and the realm of ideas exists since language 
is everything and there is nothing outside of the text. Contemporary forms of 
idealism tend to reject a causal approach to social and political analysis in which the 
relative weights of the material and ideational factors are assessed. They rather focus 
on constitutive logics and processes – the construction, in discourse, of those objects 
on which material status is conventionally conferred. In this way, idealists tend to 
‘deconstruct’ and dissolve the distinction between the ideational and the material. 
Since the main purpose of idealists' analysis tends to be less the elucidation of causal 
factors responsible for particular outcomes than an attempt to establish the 
(discursive) conditions of existence of specific social and political practices, Figure 
1's schematic depiction is not completely accurate. In the final analysis, what is more 
accurate is that the contemporary idealists confine their analyses to the discursive 
(which they perceive as coextensive with the social). 
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 Figure 1: The role of ideational factors in political explanation (Hay, 2002: 206) 
1.Idealism:  
Postmodernists; interpretivists; some discursive analysts 
 IDEAS                   OUTCOMES 
2.Materialism: 
Marxists (historical materialists); rational choice theorists; realists and neo-
realists 
 IDEAS                      OUTCOMES 
 
 MATERIAL FACTORS (interests) 
 
3.Constructivism: 
Constructivists; critical realists; some historical institutionalists; some ‘critical’  
discourse analysts 
 
      IDEAS 
                                                     OUTCOMES          
          MATERIAL 
    FACTORS                                                                               
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Table 1: Positions in the material-ideational debate (Hay, 2002: 206) 
 
Account  Prioritises ideational Prioritises material                                  
factors and    factors and causal 
    constitutive logics  logics   
        
 
Simple view    Idealism   Materialism 
of material-ideational 
 
Dialectical view of  “Thick”constructivism  “Thin”constructivism; 
Material-ideational       critical realism 
 
 
 The second position, contemporary materialism, usually takes one of two 
forms. The first of these, often associated with an aggressive and assertive 
behavioralism, dismisses non-material factors as irrelevant to political science, which 
is modeled closely on the natural sciences.  In this rigid positivist position, the 
ideational realm is dismissed as a mere rhetorical distraction whereas the material is 
accepted to circumscribe the realm of the real. Advocates of this view argue that the 
purpose of political science should be the elucidation of the ‘genuine’ (read material) 
causal mechanisms responsible for specific political outcomes. 
 Recent years have witnessed a subtle shift in emphasis and a remarkable 
softening in tone among materialist scholars. Many contemporary materialists are 
prepared to concede the seeming dependence of political outcomes upon the ideas 
actors hold about the environments in which they find themselves. However, 
according to their view, ideas which animate and inform political behavior are, in 
fact, shaped by material circumstances – principally by material interests; thus, ideas 
should not be attributed any independent causal role. 
 The third position is that of constructivism. Consructivists recognize that we 
cannot hope to understand political behavior without understanding the ideas actors 
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hold about the contexts in which they find themselves. They argue that political 
outcomes are not produced directly from the desires, motivations and cognitions of 
the immediate actors themselves, but emerge from a complex interaction of material 
and ideational factors. As Colin Hay puts it, according to constructivists: 
 
Political outcomes are, in short, neither a simple reflection of actors’ 
intentions and understandings nor of the contexts which give rise to such 
intentions and understandings. Rather, they are a product of the impact of the 
strategies actors devise as means to realize their intentions upon a context, 
which favours certain strategies over others and does so irrespective of the 
intentions of the actors themselves (Hay, 2002: 208).  
 
  
Yet there is not a homogeneous school of constructivism. Constructivism is 
constituted from a wide range of positions. As illustrated in Table 1, the idealist end 
of the spectrum contains varieties of ‘thick’ constructivism eager to privilege the 
constitutive role of ideas without entirely denying the significance of material 
factors. At the other end of the spectrum there are varieties of critical realism whose 
rather ‘thinner’ constructivism tends to emphasize instead the constraints that the 
material world places on such discursive constructions. However, each of these 
positions shares a complex or dialectical view of the relationship between the 
ideational and the material. 
 As it is interested in the decision-making process of the US security policies, 
this thesis benefits from the literatures of both Foreign Policy Analysis and Security 
Studies.8 Therefore, an historical overview of the place of ideas in those literatures 
will follow. 
 
                                                 
8 It is sometimes difficult to draw a certain line between foreign and security policies. Security issues 
mostly include military component, whereas foreign policy issues are broader to include political, 
economic, environmental and also security issues. Therefore, although there are conceptual 
differences between ‘foreign’ and ‘security’ policies, ‘foreign policy’ can be used instead of the term 
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1.3. IDEAS AND SECURITY STUDIES 
It is not easy to write on the role of ideas on security policy because the field of 
security in particular, and the discipline of IR more generally, have long been 
influenced by materialist approaches. Thanks to progress achieved in studies of ideas 
since the end of the Cold War, however, current IR theory now shows signs of 
overcoming this materialist predominance, paving a way for the examination of the 
ideational context of policy formation.9 The contributions of constructivist scholars, 
along with this constructivist turn in International Relations, has created more space 
and also recognition for ideational analyses of world events.10
 After World War II, ‘states,’ perceived as the main players in international 
arena, became predominant in the field of economics and security. Under the 
influence of Keynesian economics, advance towards the realization of welfare states 
expanded state functions. Governments regarded themselves as responsible for 
providing for the economic well being of their citizens and this naturally extended 
the powers of state. In this context, the protection of national security, perceived as 
an objective identification and neutralization of threats to the state, became a central 
priority of government. The realist or conventional understanding of security, which 
this international context helped to establish, continued to dominate IR until the 
international realm faced different types of events - such as the demise of the Soviet 
                                                                                                                                          
‘security policy’ since the latter is involved by the former conceptually. For an analysis on the vague 
distinction between foreign and security policies see Waever (1995: 46-86). 
9 The works on the role of ideas in International Relations have so far been published mostly on 
International Political Economy. Probably the most known work on the role of ideas on foreign policy 
is the Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change (1993), edited by Judith 
Goldstein and Robert Keohane, which also does not really address security issues. The terms ‘ideas’ 
and ‘security’ are brought together for the case of Gorbachev Revolution in 1989, which mark the end 
of the Cold War, under the framework of the role of ‘epistemic communities’ on the so-called 
revolution. However the analytical framework of this “epistemic communities” approach is not fully 
consistent with the one of this dissertation. See Mendelson (1993). For a special issue on the 
‘epistemic communities,’ see International Organization (1992). 
10 For some of the constructivist contributions to the field of security studies see Hopf (1998) and 
Farrell (2002). 
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Union, which the traditional security studies hardly explained (Dalby, 1990). 
 The collapse of the Soviet Union, which could not have been anticipated in the 
scenarios of traditional security analysts, the influence of the idea of liberalism after 
1990s and the crises in Yugoslavia challenged conventional studies of security 
(Katzenstein, 1996: xi-xii). These substantial changes in the international arena in 
1990’s paved way to the alternative approaches in International Relations discipline. 
Security Studies have also been effected by these new inclinations in IR (Desch, 
1998: 141-45). 
 Within this context of emerging challenges to traditional security studies, the 
role of ideas on security issues and international relations was developed mostly by 
constructivists. While conventional security studies handled the status quo to analyze 
general patterns of state behavior as their areas of research, constructivists analyzed 
sources of change. Constructivists regarded security as a phenomenon of 
intersubjectivity, as a social construct and focused on culture as well as civilization; 
the role of ideas, norms and values in the constitution of the object which is to be 
secured; and the historical context within which the process takes place (Adler, 2002: 
100-104). Constructivist analyses also focused on collective identity formation to 
determine how contemporary insecurities are created and intensified by settled 
oppositions of inside/outside, self/other, particularity/universality and 
identity/difference (See Walker, 1993; Wendt, 1987; and Wendt, 1992).  According 
to the constructivist view, the definition of security is important. By the usage of the 
security discourse, the meaning of ‘security’ can be extended to include a wider 
range of issues and this may have important implications (Waever, 1995). 
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1.4. IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS 
As a reflection of the broad scope of analysis of the Political Science discipline, the 
field of Foreign Policy Analysis has always been diverse and dynamic, with scholars 
addressing an assortment of substantive topics through a variety of methodological 
approaches (Gerner, 1995: 17). These topics ranged from societal sources of foreign 
policy to cognitive processes and psychological attributes, as well as from crisis 
decision-making and artificial intelligence to bureaucratic structures and processes.11  
 Since the 1960s, studies on foreign policy analysis have evolved gradually by 
the contributions of scholars with various approaches to foreign policy making. In 
this respect, some scholars analyzed societal factors, such as public opinion, ethnic 
or special-interest groups, the media and multinational corporations, all of which 
influence the foreign policy making within the state. Other analysts interrogated the 
cognitive processes and psychological attributes of decision makers to discover how 
an individual’s belief system, the way s/he perceives, interprets and processes 
information about an international situation. Such analysts also tried to understand 
how idiosyncratic personal attributes explain foreign policy choices. Scholars who 
focused on crisis decision making used content analysis within the framework of a 
stimulus-response model, taken from psychology, to examine interaction between 
decisional units. A somewhat different approach - computational modeling (or 
artificial intelligence) - employed case-specific information to model foreign policy 
process. Computer scientists using such models also attempted to model the 
cognitive process itself. 
 Another approach to the study of foreign policy studied the impact of 
bureaucratic structures, subcultures and decision making processes on eventual 
                                                 
11  For the general overview of the studies on foreign policy analyses, this dissertation benefitted from 
Gerner (1995) and also from Hudson and Vore (1991).  
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choices made.  In the 1970s, research by Graham Allison and a few of his colleagues 
on bureaucratic politics was especially significant in the development of this field.12 
Allison’s well-known volume Essence of Decision (1971) on the Cuban missile crisis 
proposes three complementary models to analyze the decision-making process that 
occurred in October 1962: namely, the rational actor, organizational processes and 
bureaucratic/governmental politics models.  Model I (rational actor) argues that 
foreign policy choices are the purposive actions of unified, rational governments, 
based on plausible calculations of utility and probability, to achieve definable state 
goals. Model II (organizational processes) asserts that foreign policy is best 
understood as the choices and outputs of a group of semifeudal, loosely allied 
organizations within the government that are interested in their own interests and 
following standard operating procedures.  Model III (governmental politics) claims 
that foreign policy is the result of intensive competition among decision makers and 
bargaining along regularized channels among players positioned hierarchically 
within the government bureaucracy, each with his or her own perspective on the 
issues of discussion. In this scenario, it is the “pulling and hauling” of individual 
actors that produces the final outcome (Allison and Zelikow, 1999).  
 Among these three approaches to foreign policy analysis, the bureaucratic 
approach has enjoyed a privileged status among academic descriptions of the 
decision-making process in the United States and Western Europe. There were at 
least two reasons for this. Firstly, scholars trained in these regions usually focused on 
these areas. Secondly, bureaucratic factors are often most significant in countries 
with massive and complex governmental structures, like those existent in both 
Western Europe and the US. 
                                                 
12 Some of these valuable contributions are Neustadt (1970), Allison and Halperin (1972), Halperin 
and Kanter (1973) and Halperin (1974). See also Allison and Zelikow (1999). 
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 Some foreign policy analysts have had a wide research agenda since decades 
to analyze how cognitive processing has affected foreign policy choices. This type of 
research included issues concerned with ideas, since it investigates individually held 
beliefs about social reality that identify possibilities for action, reflect moral 
principles, and specify causal relationships (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 6-7). The 
focus on ideas within the context of foreign policy analysis has been further enriched 
by the constructivist turn in IR towards the end of the 20th century. In accordance 
with studies of the concept of identity, which are consistent with the constructivist 
perspective, the study of foreign policy analysis has also had an ideational turn. The 
argument of this ideational analysis was that foreign policy developments originate 
in influential ideas and beliefs. Although the focus on identity began with the 
constructivist turn, some scholars who have adapted this concept at the state level to 
explain foreign policy have been careful to distance themselves from the 
constructivist approach.13
   
1.5. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
This dissertation’s conception of ‘ideas’ approximates that expressed by Goldstein 
and Keohane in their book Ideas and Foreign Policy (1993).  Accordingly, "ideas" 
specifies the beliefs individuals have about the foreign and security policies of their 
country – that is, those ideas which reflect different types of understandings of 
national interest and possess correspondingly different types of proposals for the 
country to implement as foreign and security policies. 
 The conception of ideas in this thesis may also be understood as a dimension of 
an ideology – that is, a system of ideas to gather people around it (Brands, 2003: 2). 
                                                 
13 For the critics of constructivist approaches by these scholars, see Kaarbo (2003).  
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An ideology may have its own interpretations of and proposals for state issues of 
domestic and foreign concern. These areas of concern may include government 
policies on economy, education and social rights, as well as on national foreign and 
security policies. 
 As previously specified, this dissertation adopts a constructivist approach to 
the issue it analyses. Accordingly, this thesis argues that ideas are not determining 
factors on their own, independent from the material circumstances. Ideas and 
material factors do not exist independently of each other. They constitute, not cause, 
each other. Political outcomes, thus, are reflections of neither the intentions and 
understandings nor the contexts, which help shape those intentions and 
understandings. Rather, such outcomes are a product of a complex interaction of 
material and ideational factors. 
 It can be alleged that there is an “elective affinity” between ideas and 
‘circumstances’14 – that is, the material dimension of the world (Hall, 1993: 45). A 
phrase borrowed from eighteenth-century chemistry, "elective affinity" was 
popularized by Goethe who thus entitled one of his novels in 1809. A part of that 
novel is worth noting, since it exemplifies how the ideas and circumstances are 
closely intertwined: 
        
Those natures which, when they meet, quickly lay hold on and mutually 
affect one another we call affined. This affinity is sufficiently striking in the 
case of alkalis and acids which, although they are mutually antithetical, and 
perhaps precisely because they are so, must decidedly seek and embrace one 
another, modify one another, and together form a new substance (Goethe, 
1971: 52-53; Quoted in Hall, 1993: 45).  
  
This interrelation and interpenetration of ideas and circumstances is so deep and 
subtle that it is a difficult task to detect the relative weights of the two influences - 
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ideational and material - on policy choices. This problem of isolating ideas from 
circumstances perhaps explains social science scholars’ historical disregarding of 
ideas’ role in their analyses. However, because of this disregard their analyses have 
been bound to be simplistic (Hall, 1993: 45). 
  How can this difficulty of separation be overcome? As long as the fit between 
ideas and circumstances remains tight, how can we detect the influence of ideas on 
foreign or security policies and thus indicate and illustrate their determinant 
importance for political outcomes? John Hall proposes two methods that deserve 
attention. Firstly, he argues that, as the examples in Goldstein and Keohane’s Ideas 
and Foreign Policy demonstrate, when circumstances change and responses remain 
culturally stable, the influence of the institutionalized ideas can be examined. This is 
a relatively easier way to detect ideas’ role. In explaining his second proposal to 
detect ideational impact, Hall asserts: 
 
There is another point at which an independent ideational impact can 
sometimes be detected. If a Marxist would be able to accept Weber’s 
account of the rise of capitalism, it remains the case that Marxism imagines, 
effectively …that there is a virtual correspondence between circumstance 
and idea such that the stimulus of circumstance will automatically bring 
forth an ideological response (Hall, 1993: 47). 
 
In other words even Marxism’s imagination of  ‘ideas and the circumstances’ is in 
the way that they are so bound to each other that a stimulus of circumstance might 
cause an ideological reaction. Hall’s second way to detect ideas’ role may well be 
accepted to be applicable to our case. If the analysis presented in forthcoming 
chapters demonstrates a substantial correspondence between neoconservative ideas 
and US security policy choices after September 11, we may conclude that the Bush 
                                                                                                                                          
14 This distinction is used repeatedly by Hall (1993) to refer to the material and the ideational 
dimensions of the world.  
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Administration’s foreign policy after 9/11 was a reaction, based largely on ideas, to a 
material incident. 
 Despite the difficulties of distinguishing the role of ideas, which stems from the 
interpenetration between ideational and material realms, there are some situations in 
which the influence of ideas on political outcomes becomes more obvious: in cases 
of crisis or, for example, of tremendous historical upheaval or, indeed, in any 
situation that provokes a questioning of the causal relationships between political 
strategies and their expected outcomes (Greve, 2004).  Thus, studies about the 
influence of ideas on policy outcomes and policy change can explain, for instance, 
how Keynesian thinking had a decisive effect on the postwar creation of an open 
world economy regulated by international organizations. The atmosphere of 
uncertainty after such crisis situations, like war or depression, may create such 
domestic instability that leaders feel compelled to disregard as outmoded 
conventional political solutions, thereby introducing new methods of both 
understanding and handling their countries’ “new” problems. And, thus, they turn to 
their advisors for new insights or new recipes for the countries’ problems. These new 
ideas, if they prevail in the policy-making discussions of the administration, in turn 
precipitate different foreign and security policies, which then modify the societal 
structure of the states within which they are located.   
 Because ideas’ role on political outcomes is more obvious in some cases, 
interested scholars necessarily focus their analyses on those types of historical events 
that demonstrate the role of ideas on foreign policy.15 The world has faced two such 
historical events in the last fifteen years: the first, the end of the Cold War,  triggered 
work on ideas’ role within international relations, effectively challenging and shifting 
                                                 
15 For instance, The Gorbachev Revolution in 1989 is analyzed by Checkel (1993) and Mendelson 
(1993) to demonstrate the effects of ideas on foreign policy.  
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the longstanding materialist dominance within academic IR circles; the second such 
event, September 11's attacks on New York and Washington offer a similarly 
conducive case study for examining the impact of ideas on the formation of foreign 
and security policy (Greve, 2004).  
To be clear, however, the above schematization in no way claims a lesser role 
for ideational factors in situations other than historical upheavals, as the ideational 
and the material are always closely connected.  But it does ascribe to the notion that 
the role of the ideational factors becomes more obvious in a context of shifting 
perceptions and cognitions. Once “crisis” is resolved - and a new paradigm installed 
- ideas held by the actors often become internalized and unquestioned once again, but 
this does not mean that ideas thereby cease to affect actors’ behavior.  
 Keohane and Goldstein argue that “Ideas serve the purpose of guiding 
behavior under conditions of uncertainty by stipulating causal patterns or providing 
compelling ethical or moral motivations for action.” (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 
16; emphasis added). The ability of ideas to constrain and compel actors to behave in 
certain ways is shaped by the degree to which actors are bound to their ideas. In other 
words, the more devoted actors are to their ideas, the more constrained by - or 
enslaved to - their ideas are their actions.  
 
1.6. DISCUSSION ON THE APPLICATION TO THE CASE OF GEORGE W. 
BUSH’S SECURITY POLICIES 
This dissertation’s constructivist approach eases the assumptions of Graham Allison 
and some of his colleagues’ well-known approaches, and proposes a more flexible 
approach to the decision making process for US security policy. Allison’s 
bureaucratic politics approach involves strict assumptions about the role of agencies 
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competing with each other within the Executive branch, arguing that the political 
outcome is often a result of a bargaining among government agencies. The 
constructivist approach of this thesis modifies Allison’s paradigm by including the 
role of ideological cohorts within and without the Executive. In this regard, Michael 
Nacht's term ‘ideological cohort’ provides a better explanation for the course of 
policy making within the Bush Administration. According to Nacht: 
 
[Ideological cohorts] are people with a set of value systems in common. 
They have the same value system, but they do not work in the same place. 
Some could be in press, some could be on Capitol Hill, some could be in the 
State Department, the Defense Department, the Arms Control Agency, when 
it existed, …and elsewhere. And they all have a similar view of things. This 
becomes a powerful “congeniality” force, because they actually even 
collaborate with each other, even though it’s sort of not part of the rules. 
Opposed to them is another cohort, with diametrically opposed, markedly 
different views, that is equally across agency lines. So sometimes the 
struggle is not the Defense versus State or Executive versus Congressional, 
it’s ideological group A versus ideological group B. And then the media and 
others, people in academia, are used in a way as pawns to justify these 
arguments. That’s a very powerful force I have not seen in the literature 
(Nacht, 2003). 
 
Analyzing the effects of neoconservative ideas on US security policy faces a 
methodological problem of drawing conclusions from the presence of 
neoconservatives on one hand, and of reducing complex decision-making processes 
to inputs of ideas and outputs of foreign policy, on the other (Greve, 2004). I attempt 
to solve the first problem by clarifying to what degree neoconservatives are bound to 
their ideas - a factor determining whether they will transform ideas into policy when 
opportunity to do so arises. I similarly attempt to solve the second problem by 
addressing the structure of security-related decision-making within the US. 
 Of course, proponents of one ideology do not always share fully the same 
mindset. Similarly, there often exists different branches within particular ideologies. 
However, in order to make analysis possible, this dissertation focuses areas of 
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intersection.  That is, granting the necessary multiplicy of neoconservative mindsets, 
I concentrate on areas of identifiable agreement: namely, advocacy of an active 
foreign policy predicated on the spread of democracy, the preservation of American 
supremacy and the fight against non-democratic regimes (Greve, 2004).  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
NEOCONSERVATISM 
 
 
 
This chapter outlines neoconservatism and introduces key neoconservatives within 
the Bush Administration. Neoconservatives are discussed intensely in the media 
especially in the run-up to the Iraq war in early 2003. Much has been told about the 
moot influence of the neoconservatives on the Bush Administration. Before 
embarking upon the evaluation of the role of neoconservative ideas on Bush’s 
security policies, neoconservatism itself requires exploration.  
Today's neoconservative actors operate within a larger neoconservative 
network of advisory boards, think tanks, foundations and media (Greve, 2004). As 
the neoconservative voting base within America's population at large is itself 
unremarkable, the relative success of neoconservative influence on US foreign and 
securing policy-making derives from precisely this existence of a large 
neoconservative network. The following sections thus introduce neoconservatism as 
an ideological cohort, mentioning both neoconservatism’s ideology and the 
neoconservative network with its presence in various areas such as think tanks, 
media and politics. 
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 2.1. ORIGINS 
‘Neoconservatism’ is a phrase first used by the American socialist author Michael 
Harrington in his book The Other America (1962) to solely define his former left-
wing allies (Taube, 2000). He considered these “neo” conservatives because many of 
them had been anti-Stalinist leftists or liberals before moving to the far right (Lind, 
2003). A small group of New York intellectuals, primarily Jewish, began their 
intellectual careers as young Trotskyites or socialists. Early members of this clique 
included Irving Kristol, his wife Gertrude Himmelfarb, Norman Podhoretz and his 
wife Midge Decter. As years elapsed, many of these people abandoned their Marxist 
pasts and morphed into liberal anti-communists, becoming politically active within 
both the Democratic Party and journalism. As the Democratic Party itself shifted 
further Left over time, neoconservatives gravitated toward the right-wing Republican 
Party during the 1970s and 1980s. Considering the neocon beliefs supportive of a 
hawkish foreign policy, and also the Left’s moderate foreign policy position in 
American politics, this shift was understandable for the neoconservatives.  
Even the founding fathers of neoconservatism, Irving Kristol and Norman 
Podhoretz, thought that neocoservatism no more existed after 1980. Irving Kristol, 
co-editor of The Public Interest with fellow neocon Daniel Bell, believed that 
conservatives and neoconservatives have largely merged since Reagan’s presidential 
victory in 1980. In his 1995 book Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea, 
Kristol asked “Where neoconservatism stands today?” and himself answered: “It is 
clear that what can fairly be described as the neoconservative impulse … was a 
generational phenomenon, and has now been pretty much absorbed into a larger, 
more comprehensive conservatism.” (Wolfson, 2004) A year later, Norman 
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Podhoretz declared in an address before the American Enterprise Institute that 
“neoconservatism is dead.” (Wolfson, 2004) And, arguing that neoconservatism’s 
death was not a failure but a success, he articulated in the March 1996 issue of 
Commentary, the journal he edited for nearly fifty years, this is because “the 
conservative work which remains to be done in every realm will be marked and 
guided and shaped by the legacy neo-conservatism has left behind.” (Taube, 2000) 
This interpretation of Podhoretz is consistent with Irving Kristol’s, considering the 
latter’s definition of “the historical task and political purpose of neoconservatism” as 
“to convert the Republican party, and American conservatism in general, against 
their respective wills, into a new kind of conservative politics suitable to governing a 
modern democracy,” in August 25, 2003, issue of The Weekly Standard. Not even a 
decade after these obituaries for neoconservatism by its founding fathers, in the same 
issue of The Weekly Standard, in 2003, Irving Kristol declared that “neoconservatism 
began enjoying a second life” with the George W. Bush Administration (Kristol, 
2003).  
 
2.2. BELIEFS AND FOREIGN POLICY PROPOSALS  
Although neoconservatives’ social policy proposals are at least as important as their 
views on foreign policy, they are mostly identified with the latter. This was 
reasonable since their focus turned towards foreign policy as their social policy 
proposals, such as welfare reform, have become mainstream in American politics 
(Economist, 2003). The following few paragraphs will offer a brief overview of the 
neoconservative foreign policy proposals, which will follow by the origins of the 
latter under the next subtitle: “Intellectual Background.” Having some knowledge 
about the current neocon policy proposals while analyzing the sources of their views 
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on foreign policy in the next part, will offer a better insight about the 
neoconservatives with their past and present.  
Neoconservatives are mostly associated with their hawkish foreign policy 
beliefs. Neoconservatives of the first generation were staunch anti-communists who 
favored confrontation with, rather than containment of, the Soviet Union. The second 
generation of the neocons was identified and has risen on the public agenda again 
with a hawkish stance in foreign policy: they advocated the recent Iraq war, fostered 
regime change and supported America’s war against terrorism. 
Neoconservatives base their arguments on the notion that the US faces the 
challenge of managing a unipolar world after the collapse of the Soviet Union. They 
argue that the US should not hesitate to use its unrivaled power to promote its values 
around the world. They believe the new threats the US faces can no longer be 
reliably contained, and thus must be prevented, sometimes through preemptive 
military action. They contend that the US should increase its defense budget and 
confront threats aggressively enough. One such threat, they argued, was the Saddam 
Hussein regime in Iraq and its alleged pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Since 
the first Gulf War in 1991, the neocons insistently advocated Saddam Hussein’s 
ouster. 
The neocons believe that the authoritarianism and theocracy have allowed 
anti-Americanism to flourish in the Middle East, which in turn fostered international 
terrorism. Therefore, they advocate democratic transformation in the Middle East. 
They see Iraq as a first step. This is why their role in the US decision to launch the 
war against Iraq in 2003, came under intense public debate before and after that war.   
Another characteristic of the neoconservative ideas is the lack of trust to 
multilateral institutions. They argue that the multilateral institutions, which they do 
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not trust to effectively neutralize threats to global security, unnecessarily hamper the 
US (Christian Science Monitor, n.d.b). They are especially suspicious of the United 
Nations, which they believe is working according to the rules of ‘realpolitik,’ rather 
than being the source of international ethics (Krauthammer, Winter 2002/03: 11; 
Quoted in Han, 2004: 140). Not surprisingly, however, the neocons are not that much 
critical of NATO, in which there is an apparent US weight. 
 
2.3. INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND 
Intellectually, there have been marks of various strands of ideas on neoconservative 
thinking. The most prominent ones are Max Schachtman’s version of Trotskyism – 
in the area of anti-Sovietism - and the elitist ideas of a political philosopher, Leo 
Strauss, who is a German citizen of Jewish origin (The Free Dictionary, n.d.b).  The 
neocon desire to spread democracy abroad, if necessary by force, parallels Trotsky’s 
aim of a world socialist revolution. Neocons’ anti-Soviet tendencies may also have 
emanated from the influence of this Trotskyism, especially considering the Great 
Purges targeting alleged Trotskyites in the Soviet Union.  
Not only Max Schachtman’s, but there are also signs of Leo Strauss’s beliefs 
on the neoconservative thinking. Strauss believed on the “existence of a universal 
truth, and the public’s incapability to understand or accept those universal principles 
of right.” Therefore, according to him, there was a necessity of a “perpetual 
deception of the citizens by those in power,” because the citizens needed to be led, 
they needed strong rulers to tell them what’s good for them (The Free Dictionary, 
n.d.b). It is not difficult to discern the marks of Strauss’ elitist views on the 
neoconservative objective to transform the Middle East by a top-down approach.  
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A number of neoconservatives such as Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Richard Perle and 
Paul Wolfowitz were Schachmanites in their youth, while some other 
neoconservatives were involved in the Social Democrats of the US, which was 
formed by Schachtman’s supporters in 1970s. And two neoconservatives, Michael 
Ledeen and Paul Wolfowitz, are the supporters of Straussianism. The latter, 
especially, is a self identified Straussian who pursued his PhD. in Political Science at 
the University of Chicago during Strauss’ tenure there (The Free Dictionary, n.d.a). 
 
2.4. TODAY’S NEOCONSERVATIVES 
To put it briefly, today’s neoconservatives are Washington intellectuals, primarily 
Jewish, who “believe in using American might to promote American ideals 
abroad.”16 They form a cohesive group, having close relations among themselves 
with nearly similar ideals for enhancing the security of the United States. If there was 
a need to place the neoconservatives within the IR discipline conceptually and to 
name them accordingly, their place would be close to an “ideological cohort,” which 
is explained in the previous chapter. Because they have the characteristics of an 
ideological cohort: They are part of a larger neoconservative network of advisory 
boards, think tanks, foundations and media, which will be discussed later in this 
chapter. Most of them have similar backgrounds. They are dominantly professors 
(such as Paul Wolfowitz and Steve Cambone) or lawyers (like Douglas Feith, 
Scooter Libby and John Bolton). They are members of the same think tanks, such as 
the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). They write for the same magazine, The 
Weekly Standard, edited by Bill Kristol, son of Irving Kristol who is known as one of 
neoconservatism’s founding fathers.  And they co-author the same papers or reports 
                                                 
16 This definition in quotation belongs to neoconservative Max Boot, quoted from his December 2002 
Wall Street column entitled “What the Heck  is a Neocon?” Quoted in Hagan (n. d.).  
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[The PNAC Report “Rebuilding America’s Defenses” (2000), for instance, with 
many neocons among its 27 co-signatories, became highly influential in the US.] 
New York Times’ summary of the position of the neocons, also fits highly with the 
one of an ideological cohort: “They [the neocons] have penetrated the culture at 
nearly every level from the halls of Pentagon,” which adds that “they’ve accumulated 
the wherewithal financially [and] professionally to broadcast what they think over 
the air waves to the masses or over cocktails to those at the highest levels of 
government” (Quoted in Muravchik, 2003).  
 Although neoconservatives sometimes differ among themselves in terms of 
foreign policy ideas (some of them are hardliners, others are more moderate), this 
does not mean that the neoconservative clique does not exist. Irving Kristol calls this 
clique as “neoconservative persuasion.” (Kristol, 2003) Whether it is called as a 
movement, clique or a persuasion, the existence of such an ideological group in 
American politics has become a widely acknowledged issue in academia. 
It is often difficult to draw borderlines for sociological or ideological groups. 
This has been the case also for the neoconservatives. Many people were alleged to be 
neocons in the previous years, and some denied those allegations while others 
accepted them. Some observers even confused whether some hardliners such as Dick 
Cheney or Donald Rumsfeld, two of the founders of the neoconservative institution 
The Project for the New American Century, were neocons or not. These two figures, 
and many other hardliners in American politics, shared some foreign policy ideas 
with the neocons, but not as much as to be called ‘neoconservatives.’  
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2.5. INSTITUTIONS 
Since the end of the pre-Vietnam consensus and the decline of the old foreign policy 
establishment in the 1970s, intermediary institutions have become more significant 
for the US foreign policy. Institutions like think tanks or advisory boards have started 
to contribute to the US foreign policy making more than before. Previously, the 
Council on Foreign Relations’ journal Foreign Affairs was the voice of the foreign 
policy establishment. There are currently hundreds of think tanks in the US 
concerned with foreign policy (Greve, 2004). The most important neoconservative 
institutions include the American Enterprise Institute and the Project for the New 
American Century, with some additional ones, founded after September 11, 2001, to 
support the US struggle against terrorism. Their memberships overlap to a large 
extent.  
The oldest think tank supportive of neoconservative ideas is the American 
Enterprise Institute (AEI). The AEI is a research think tank, which was founded in 
1943. It is funded by conservative foundations. It has 50 resident scholars and 
fellows including Irving Kristol, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Richard Perle, Joshua 
Muravchik, Danielle Pletka, David Frum, Thomas Donnelly, Reuel Marc Gerecht, 
Lynne Cheney and Robert Bork (Eurolegal, n.d.).  
The agenda of the regime change in Iraq was mostly advocated by another 
neoconservative institution, The Project for the New American Century (PNAC), 
whose founding members include neoconservatives like William Kristol, Robert 
Kagan, Paul Wolfowitz, and Lewis Libby; together with other important figures such 
as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, who are not neoconservatives. Housed in the 
same building with the AEI, PNAC has only seven full-time staff members, in 
addition to its board of directors (Wikipedia, n.d.d). However, its voice was heard 
 
 
31
when many of its members later held important posts in the George W. Bush 
Administration (Economist, 2003).  
Although PNAC is not purely composed of neoconservative members, its 
ideological stance is definitely neoconservative. Since PNAC’s establishment in 
1997, the PNAC’s founders wrote about the United States' global responsibilities and 
reminded the essential elements of the Reagan Administration's success within 
PNAC’s “Statement of Principles.” They argued that Clinton Administration’s 
foreign and defense policy was adrift. And they continued: “We aim to change this. 
We aim to make the case and rally support for American global leadership” (PNAC, 
n.d.). A PNAC open letter to former president Clinton, dated January 26, 1998, came 
up to public agenda in the run-up to the Iraq war, in 2003. In that letter, the 
signatories wrote: 
 
Given the magnitude of the threat, the current policy [of containment towards 
Iraq], which depends for its success upon the steadfastness of our coalition 
partners and upon the cooperation of Saddam Hussein, is dangerously 
inadequate. The only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility 
that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction. In 
the near term, this means a willingness to undertake military action as 
diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam 
Hussein and his regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of 
American foreign policy.  
We urge you to articulate this aim, and turn your Administration’s 
attention to implementing a strategy for removing Saddam’s regime from 
power (PNAC, 1998). 
 
What they urged Clinton to do was embarked upon by George W. Bush when those 
signatories held important positions in that Administration, but not before the 
reassessment of the threat perceptions by the latter Administration as a conclusion of 
September 11 terrorist attacks.  
After September 11, 2001, some smaller neoconservative lobby groups were 
established to support a hard-line US stance against international terrorism such as 
 
 
32
Americans for Victory over Terrorism (AVOT), Foundation for the Defense of 
Democracies (founded by William Kristol), and the Committee for the Liberation of 
Iraq (CLI) (Greve, 2004; see also Rightweb, n.d.f). These groups, together with the 
other neocon-led and some supportive rightist institutions,17 became part of a 
campaign to support Bush Administration's preemptive agenda and security policies 
after September 11 (Rightweb, n.d.f). The following few paragraphs will offer brief 
explanations about only some of these institutions. 
Americans for Victory over Terrorism was founded in 2002 by a William 
Bennett-led group of neocons and right-wingers to defend George W. Bush's 
interventionist policies. L. Paul Bremer and James Woolsey were members of this 
institution’s adviser team. AVOT aims "to defend America's war on terrorism against 
those who would weaken the nation's resolve and erode our commitment to end the 
international menace of terrorism. AVOT will take its campaign to where it is needed 
most - college campuses, seminar rooms, editorial pages, and other media outlets" 
(Rightweb, n.d.a).  
The Committee for the Liberation of Iraq was set up in late 2002 by Bruce 
Jackson. Although the committee's advisory panel included a few relative moderates 
like Steven Solarz and Robert Kerrey, it was dominated by neocons and foreign 
policy hawks like Jeane Kirkpatrick, Robert Kagan, Newt Gingrich, Richard Perle, 
William Kristol, and James Woolsey. Its mission statement is the following: 
 
The Committee for the Liberation of Iraq was formed to promote regional 
peace, political freedom and international security by replacing the Saddam 
Hussein regime with a democratic government that respects the rights of the 
Iraqi people and ceases to threaten the community of nations.  
                                                 
17 Only some of them are Center for Security Policy, Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, 
National Endowment for Democracy, Council of Conservative Citizens, Democratic Leadership 
Council, Council for National Policy, Empower America, Earhart Foundation, Freedom House, 
Hudson Institute, Lexington Institute and Manhattan Institute. 
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The regime of Saddam Hussein has attacked its neighbors, acquired 
weapons of mass destruction, and directed those weapons against innocent 
men, women, and children. It has supported international terrorism and has 
savagely murdered and repressed the Iraqi people. The current government of 
Iraq poses a clear and present danger to its neighbors, to the United States, and 
to free peoples throughout the world. 
The Committee for the Liberation of Iraq will engage in educational and 
advocacy efforts to mobilize US and international support for policies aimed at 
ending the aggression of Saddam Hussein and freeing the Iraqi people from 
tyranny. The Committee is committed to work beyond the liberation of Iraq to 
the reconstruction of its economy and the establishment of political pluralism, 
democratic institutions, and the rule of law (Rightweb, n.d.e).  
 
Center for Security Policy was established by Frank Gaffney, and it champions a 
hard-line foreign policy for the US, including support for Likudnic policies in Israel, 
missile defense deployment, new nuclear weapons testing, development of space 
weapons, get-tough policies regarding China and North Korea, increased military 
spending, an expansive war on terrorism, and the trashing of any and all arms control 
treaties. Some of its former members were Dov S. Zakheim, Douglas Feith and 
Elliott Abrams (Rightweb, n.d.b). 
There is also another important institution which is alleged to be closely 
associated with the neoconservative movement, Jewish Institute for National 
Security Affairs (JINSA), whose self-expressed aim is threefold: to ensure a strong 
and effective US national security policy, to strengthen US cooperation with 
democratic allies and to foster the strategic relationship between the US and Israel. 
JINSA’s home page puts the third one with the sentence: “U.S.-Israel strategic 
cooperation is a vital component in the global security equation for the United States, 
and has been at the heart of JINSA’s mission since its inception in 1976” (Quotations 
are from JINSA, n.d.). JINSA also supports regime change in states known to 
provide support to terrorist groups (Disinfopedia, n.d.). In the last analysis, the views 
 
 
34
about foreign policy that JINSA supports are highly consistent with the ones of 
neoconservatism.  
 
2.6. PUBLICATIONS 
Among the prominent neoconservative publications are Commentary (the editorially 
independent journal, founded in 1945 by the American Jewish Committee), The 
Public Interest (founded in 1965 by Irving Kristol), and The National Interest 
(founded in 1985 by Irving Kristol). Although the magazine The New Republic 
(founded in 1914) is close to Democrats, it supports some neoconservative positions 
in foreign policy.18  The journal The Weekly Standard, founded by Irving Kristol’s 
son William Kristol in 1995 and funded by the Australian-American media mogul 
Rupert Murdoch, is the mouthpiece of today’s neoconservatives. The Weekly 
Standard has become one of the most important journals in Washington D.C., in 
spite of its small circulation of around 65,000. The editorial and opinion pages of The 
Wall Street Journal also have a neoconservative orientation (Greve, 2004). 
 
2.7. NEOCONSERVATIVES IN THE FIRST GEORGE W. BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION 
While searching on the neoconservatives’ past and present, their dedication to their 
ideas stands out. For decades, neoconservatives have been publicly supportive of the 
same ideas. They have been working in neoconservative institutions and writing for 
neoconservative publications for a long time. And they are “political ideologues,” 
rather than “ideological politicians” (Greve, 2004). Concession about their neocon 
beliefs for political gains is alien to them. If necessary, they can shift from one 
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political party to the other, where they believe they can find the opportunity to realize 
their ideals.  The main neocon figures that held offices in the first George W. Bush 
Administration will follow.19
Paul Wolfowitz – as Under Secretary of Defense - was the most prominent 
neoconservative in the first Bush Administration. He served as Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy from 1989 to 1993. In that era, Wolfowitz, in charge of a 700-
person team that had major responsibilities for the reshaping of military strategy and 
policy at the end of the Cold War, co-wrote with Lewis “Scooter” Libby the 1992 
draft Defense Planning Guidance which called for US military dominance over 
Eurasia and preemptive strikes against countries suspected of developing weapons of 
mass destruction (New York Times, 1992). When that draft leaked to the media, it 
had to be revised because of harsh criticisms. Although Wolfowitz later stated that 
the mentioned draft was prepared by his official personnel, and had leaked to the 
media before he saw it, he has been known as the main supporter of such arguments 
as that draft’s for a long time (Christian Science Monitor, n.d.a). Wolfowitz was one 
of the three strongest proponents of a hawkish foreign policy within the first Bush 
junior administration, together with Vice President Mr. Cheney and Secretary of 
Defense Mr. Rumsfeld. During and after the first Gulf War, Wolfowitz had 
advocated extending the war’s aim to include toppling Saddam Hussein.   
Richard Perle, who resigned in March 2003 as chairman of the Pentagon’s 
Defense Policy Board after accusations about conflicts of interest, had been the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy between 1981 and 
1987.  He is also one of the most high-profile neoconservatives, known with his 
                                                                                                                                          
18 Although The New Republic’s senior foreign policy editor, Lawrence Kaplan, co-authored a 
neoconservative manifesto on Iraq together with William Kristol (The War over Iraq, 2003), some 
harsh criticisms of neoconservative policies may also find place in the same magazine (Greve, 2004). 
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hard-line stance on national security issues. Perle helped establish two think tanks: 
The Center of Security Policy and the Jewish Institute for National Security. He was 
also a former director of the Jerusalem Post. He is a fellow at the American 
Enterprise Institute and an advisor of the counter-terrorist think tank Foundation for 
the Defense of Democracies. Perle is a prominent architect of the agenda to reshape 
the Middle East. In a report he wrote for Israel’s right-wing Likud Party with some 
other neoconservatives, entitled “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the 
Realm,” he briefly outlined the main points of this agenda (Christian Science 
Monitor, n.d.a). 
Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, was the third civilian 
at the Pentagon after Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz during the first Bush 
junior Administration.  During the Reagan administration, he was the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy. Before that, he served as 
Special Counsel to Richard Perle and as a Middle East specialist for the National 
Security Council in 1981 and 1982. He is well known for his support for the Israeli 
Likud Party. He was Vice President of the advisory board of the Jewish Institute for 
National Security Affairs in 1992. Feith was formerly a member of the neocon-led 
institution Center for Security Policy.   
I. Lewis Libby, who was Chief of Staff and national security advisor for Vice 
President Dick Cheney during the first Bush junior Administration, served as 
Principal Deputy Under Secretary (Strategy and Resources), and later, as Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy during the Bush senior’s administration. 
Libby was one of the founding members of the neoconservative institution The 
Project for the New American Century (PNAC). He co-authored the once-shocking 
                                                                                                                                          
19 For this part, this dissertation benefitted from Christian Science Monitor (n.d.a) and also from 
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Defense Planning Guidance with Paul Wolfowitz. These two, also joined William 
Kristol, Robert Kagan and some other neoconservatives in writing an influential 
report entitled, “Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for 
a New Century” (PNAC, 2000).  
Elliott Abrams was the special assistant of the president and Senior Director 
on the National Security Council for Southwest Asia, Near East, and North African 
Affairs during the first Bush junior Administration. Abrams is a former Henry 
Jackson democrat. He served in various posts of the State Department during the 
Reagan Administration. Abrams pled guilty in 1991 to withholding information from 
Congress about the Iran-Contra Affair. The following year, George H. W. Bush 
pardoned him. It may attract attention to mention that Abrams is married with Rachel 
Decter, daughter of the neoconservative couple Norman Podhoretz and Midge 
Decter.  
John Bolton was the top non-proliferation official of the US during Bush 
junior’s first term. He was one of the very few neoconservatives in the State 
Department under Colin Powell. Bolton previously worked for Reagan and Bush 
senior’s Administrations. Before his post as Under Secretary of State for Arms 
Control and International Security, he had been senior vice president of the 
neoconservative think tank American Enterprise Institute. 
 
2.8. NEOCONSERVATIVES AND ISRAEL 
While discussing the characteristics of the neoconservatives, this chapter should not 
leave out one of the most discussed issues about them: the question of their dual 
loyalty. A number of critics, such as Pat Buchanan, have accused them of putting 
                                                                                                                                          
Rightweb (n.d.d). 
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Israeli interests above those of America’s, and some other few critics have gone 
further and alleged them to be a secret Zionist cabal (Buchanan, 2003). Many 
neoconservatives have turned down these criticisms by labeling those critics as anti-
Semites. The following part is a brief discussion of this issue. 
It is a fact that all neoconservatives do not have Jewish origins. Therefore, it 
seems difficult to blame neoconservatives totally of being a Zionist cabal. Although a 
large proportion of the neoconservatives has Jewish origins, the non-Jewish 
neoconservatives include some prominent figures such as Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Max 
Boot, Frank Gaffney, and Michael Novak. It is also a fact that neocons are 
preoccupied by Israel’s security interests. However, their interest in Israel’s security 
was not such intensive before the June 1967 Six Day War, which has raised the 
specter of Israel’s military invincibility, that the neocons have become more 
preoccupied by Israel’s security interests (The Free Dictionary, n.d.b). 
The neoconservatives’ partisan support for Likud may suggest their support 
for Israel not to be merely motivated by blind ethnic loyalty (The Free Dictionary, 
n.d.b). The neoconservatives argue that the US should emulate Israeli tactics of 
preemptive attacks in response to the threats against its security, and should act in its 
national interests, regardless of international law as the policies of the current Likud 
administration. The neoconservative support for Israel may be emanated from the 
neocon’s love of the Likud style Israeli tactics in responding threats, rather than 
because of ethnic reasons.  
Neocons’ relations are most of the times oriented by their dedication on their 
views such as the spread of democracy and fight against terrorism. Therefore, one 
should not seek conspiracy theories behind the neocons’ interest in the security of 
one of the important democratic allies of the US in the Middle East; especially when 
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Israel’s currently pursued foreign policy paradigm is highly consistent with the 
neoconservatives’. Of course, at the same time, it is difficult to claim that ethnicity 
never mattered for the neoconservative actors. The security of their Jewish relatives 
in Israel may matter for a proportion of the neoconservatives. However, this does not 
prove them to be a secret Zionist cabal. They were not a secret group to have 
clandestine plans with regard to the fate of the US. Their ideas and policy proposals 
have been open to public knowledge since decades. PNAC sent an ‘open’ letter to 
former president Clinton (PNAC, 1998). The neoconservative institutions also 
explicitly articulated their aims and proposals on their Internet websites, by including 
their support for Israel.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
US FOREIGN POLICY MAKING  
AND THE BUSH TEAM 
 
 
Analyzing the US foreign policy apparatus, this chapter argues that the 
neoconservatives in the Bush Administration were among the many factors having 
effect on the US decision-making process. First of all, the chapter goes through the 
debate on the neoconservative influence in the Bush Administration. It continues by 
outlining foreign policy making in the US with regard to the constitutional powers 
and traditions of the relevant state institutions. Then, it summarizes the long-term 
ideational currents in US foreign policy and introduces top Bush officials with 
respect to their foreign policy ideas. The chapter concludes with the remarks that in 
such complex nature of the US decision-making apparatus, the rules of which are 
established by the constitution, the presence of the neocons in the Bush 
Administration does not guarantee their influence on the formulation of the US 
security policies.  
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3.1. THE DEBATE ON THE NEOCON INFLUENCE  
The debate between the neocons and their critics about the neocon influence on 
George W. Bush’s foreign policy has not produced remarkable outcomes. The critics 
accused the neocons, who are mostly of Jewish origin positioned at key foreign and 
security policy posts in George W. Bush Administration, of distorting the US foreign 
and security policies in favor of Israel’s interests. The neoconservative writers were 
highly motivated to answer the critics on equal tones, by accusing them of racism 
and conspiracy, probably because some less careful critics tended to use the terms 
“neoconservative” and “Jewish American” interchangeably implying that both 
groups are undermining the US interests.  
The critics argued that the neocons took advantage of the attacks on the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon to advance a long-standing agenda that is only 
tangentially related to keeping the United States safe from terrorism. In this view, the 
US invasion of Iraq and the threatening of Iran and Syria have little to do with the 
fight against terrorism, the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, or promotion 
of democracy. Instead, those actions mostly have to do with settling old grievances, 
putting oil-rich territory into friendly hands, and tilting the balance of power in the 
Middle East toward Israel. “Syria, Iran and Iraq are bitter enemies, with their 
weapons pointed at each other, and the terrorists they sponsor target Israel rather that 
the US,” wrote Michael Lind, a senior fellow at the New American Foundation, in 
the left-leaning British publication New Statesman. Lind was not alone in his 
argument that US policies have become far more closely aligned with Israel’s in 
recent years. The Washington Post, in a front-page article in early-February 2004 
concluded that “[f]or the first time, a US administration and a Likud government in 
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Israel are pursuing nearly identical policies,” and cited the prominent role of the 
neocons in bringing this shift (Kosterlitz, 2003).  
“The neoconservatives … are largely responsible for getting us into the war 
against Iraq,” puts Elisabeth Drew in the New York Review of Books. “ The neocon 
vision has become the hard core of American foreign policy,” observes Newsweek. 
“They have penetrated the culture at nearly every level from the halls of Pentagon,” 
declares the New York Times, adding “they’ve accumulated the wherewithal 
financially [and] professionally to broadcast what they think over the air waves to the 
masses or over cocktails to those at the highest levels of government.” “Long before 
George W. Bush reached the White House, many of these confrontations [with other 
nations] had been contemplated by the neoconservatives,” asserts the National 
Journal (Quotations are from Muravchik (2003)). These citations from the US press 
reflect an attribution of a much effective role to the neocons in driving the US 
foreign and security policies. Not surprisingly, the European press has become more 
intense than the American in accusing the neocons (Muravchik, 2003).   
The neoconservative writers hardly accepted the impact of the neocons in the 
George W. Bush Administration on the revolutionary shift of the US foreign and 
security policies. “All the officials cited as neocons such as National Security 
Council staffers Elliott Abrams and Wolfowitz are second tier policy makers,” wrote 
self-expressed neocon Max Boot (2004a), a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign 
Relations and contributing editor to The Weekly Standard. Boot noted that the new, 
more aggressive US foreign policy has the imprimatur of the most senior decision 
makers as the President George W. Bush, Vice-President Dick Cheney, Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, none 
of which is a neocon. These traditional, national interest conservatives, who in the 
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past have been suspicious of mixing ideals into US foreign policy “…have woken up 
to the need to spread democracy not because of the impact of the neocons, but 
because of the impact of the four airplanes that were hijacked on September 11, 
2001. These horrendous attacks made Bush realize that America could no longer 
ignore the despotism and fanaticism that had given rise to international terrorism” 
(Boot, 2004a). 
As regards the neocon support for Israel, neoconservative writers often 
described their support as a reflection of their broader support of democracies. They 
came up with the explanation that Israel has been a long-term strategic ally of the US 
in a very volatile region where anti-Americanism is widespread, making Israel’s and 
America’s interests converge to some point. Some added the personal impact of the 
Holocaust on the views of the prominent neoconservative thinkers, noting that 
Wolfowitz, for instance, is the son of a Polish Jewish immigrant whose family was 
killed in the Holocaust (Kosterlitz, 2003). 
 
3.2. CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS, INSTITUTIONS AND IDEOLOGIES 
REGARDING US FOREIGN POLICY 
Constitutional powers, institutions, ideologies and actors are important determinants 
in the US foreign policy making. They all have a role in the foreign policy decisions. 
It is therefore important to know them before evaluating the role of the neocon ideas 
on US foreign policy. 
 
3.2.1. CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS 
“Presidential dominance … is the usual way to characterize the US foreign policy 
making” (McCormick, 1998: 276). However, the Congress constitutionally balances 
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the President’s power on foreign policy. While the president is the chief executive of 
the United States, Congress decides which laws to be enforced; while the president 
may command the armed forces, Congress has the power “to declare war,” “to raise 
and support armies” and to provide for the Common Defense”; and while the 
President may negotiate treaties, they become binding when approved by the two-
thirds of the Senate (Wikipedia, n.d.c). In this way, the powers and responsibilities in 
the making of US foreign policy is shared between the legislative and the executive 
branches. 
 
3.2.2. INSTITUTIONS 
In the making of US foreign policy, the State Department, Department of Defense, 
National Security Council, National Security Advisor and especially the President 
himself are the key essentials to determine US foreign policy, alongside the other 
elements with more indirect influences such as the Director of CIA, ethnic lobbies, 
think tanks and the public opinion. 
Like many countries, one of the most prominent institutions in the US is the 
State Department. State Department’s traditional trend is towards solving the 
problems by diplomacy by creating international agreements. And the power of the 
Secretary of State in determining foreign policy is mostly related to his closeness to 
the president and how much the president trusts him. The intellectual circles in 
Washington, where the liberal views are predominant, feel sympathy for the State 
Department. In contrast, many people with conservative views criticize the State 
Department and argue that it cannot sufficiently protect the national interests of the 
United States with its traditional view depending on multilateralism.   
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Another significant institution to help determine US foreign and security 
policies is the Department of Defense (Pentagon). Pentagon has special relations 
with the other militaries all over the world and has an international policy agenda of 
its own. Having four command posts (Central, Europe, South and Pacific Command 
Posts) under its order with responsibilities for the military operations all over the 
world and having 700 thousand civilians and 1.4 million military personnel, together 
with a budget of hundreds of billions of dollars Pentagon has a significant place in 
the US bureaucracy. It is headed by the Secretary of Defense, who has always been a 
civilian in the US history, but among those with sufficient degree of familiarity about 
military affairs.  
Pentagon attributes the US a more active role in world politics. It does not 
attribute importance to diplomacy as much as the State Department. When these two 
come into an argument (as is the case most times), Pentagon does not easily retreat. 
Rather, it tries to keep its view on the agenda insistently. 
As originally constituted under the National Security Act of 1947, the 
National Security Council was to be a mechanism for coordinating policy options 
among the various foreign affairs bureaucracies. By statute, members were to be 
limited to the president, the vice president, secretary of state and secretary of 
defense, with the director of central intelligence and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff as advisors. These members, along with others that the president might 
choose to invite, met to consider policy options at the discretion of the president. 
Over time, the NSC system has evolved with a set of interdepartmental committees 
to support the National Security Council itself. In 1993 some additions were made to 
the regular attendees at NSC meetings. Most notably, by executive order, the 
secretary of treasury and the head of the National Economic Council were designated 
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as members of the NSC as well (McCormick, 1998: 394-400; See also 
Americanpresident, n.d.).  
The National Security Advisor also has a prominent role in US foreign policy 
making. His/her mission is to coordinate the foreign policy institutions of the US. 
Having her own personnel, the National Security Advisor is among the ones who 
meet with the president very often.20 Therefore, the National Security Advisor is very 
influential on President’s views. Of course this influence is related to the closeness 
and trusteeship between the two. Among the other foreign policy actors, the Vice-
President is influential according to his interest in foreign affairs. The Director of 
CIA and the Chief Commander of the Central Army are of secondary importance in 
foreign policy. Their mission is restricted to giving reports to the government.21
 
3.2.3. IDEOLOGICAL FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS 
Traditional views on US foreign policy have faced some changes since the 
establishment of the country in the 18th century. Two foreign policy approaches are 
generally predominant today: realism and idealism, both of which can be subdivided 
into two schools of thought: hawkish and traditional realism versus liberal 
internationalism and democratic imperialism.22 Although another approach to US 
                                                 
20 National Security Advisor’s office in the White House, is a few steps far from the President’s Oval 
Office. 
21 The Director of CIA gives the President a short briefing about the intelligence he has got from all 
over the world every morning. 
22 Regarding the ideological foreign policy trends in the US, this thesis has chosen to use the typology 
of Hakan Tunç (2004), in order to benefit from his more update analyses on the issue, including 
specific references to Bush junior’s first Administration. There are also other sources on the 
ideological trends regarding the US foreign policy. Walter McDougall’s book Promised  Land, 
Crusader State identifies two main impulses that influenced American foreign policy throughout its 
history: one isolationist and the other is more interventionist. McDougall, 1997). Also Walter Russell 
Mead classifies the ideological currents in terms of American foreign policy since the establishment of 
the US. He explains four schools of thought, which dominated US foreign policy interchangeably 
throughout the history: Hamiltonianism (including the elements from liberal internationalism, but 
more hospitable to the instruments of warfare than the liberal internationalists, when the global order 
of economic and trade relations – which is believed to keep the US extremely strong - is threatened by 
a country), Wilsonianism (a version of idealism with a conviction to spread democracy in the world, 
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foreign policy, isolationalism, has some legacy on the anti-war sentiments of the 
American society (Muravchik, 1991: 13-15) and though authors like Pat Buchanan 
are still supportive of an isolationist view on US foreign policy, realism and idealism 
have interchangeably been dominant in US foreign policy since the end of the Cold 
War. Neither Clinton nor Bush junior Administrations could be uninterested of the 
politics outside the US. Clinton militarily engaged to the Balkans whereas Bush 
junior did the same to the Middle East. 
National security, strategic interests and a cold-blooded approach to the 
balance of power relations among countries, are significant elements of the realist 
view. Realists emphasize the necessity of military power and attribute importance 
mostly to militarily powerful and strategically significant states such as China and 
Russia. Most realists, for instance, do not regard today’s militarily weak European 
Union as a serious threat despite its remarkable economic power. Realists argue that 
foreign policies should not be made under the light of ethical standards. Giving 
prominence to values such as democracy and human rights in foreign relations, 
realists assert, will be wrong and harmful since such a view regards national security 
of secondary importance. 
As the proponents of the realist paradigm are united on the importance of 
military power and national security, they differ on the strategies of how to maintain 
that security. Some realists favor multilateral policies depending on international 
                                                                                                                                          
which differs from democratic imperialism by its belief in multilateral institutions and its respect for 
international law as well as in multilateral institutions like the International Criminal Court and the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), Jacksonianism (close to hawkish realism) and Jeffersonianism 
(close to traditional realism).  In his book published in 2002, Mead argues that the prominent 
ideological trends in the first year of the Bush junior Administration were Jacksonianism and 
Jeffersonianism. (Mead, 2002: 308). There is also Joshua Muravchik’s book Exporting Democracy 
(1991), which brings arguments to explain why “democratic imperialism,” (or in Muravchik’s own 
terms “democratic internationalism,”) serves for the best of the US foreign policy.  
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agreements and coalitions. These are widely called “traditional realists.”23 According 
to this “traditional realist” view, deterrence and containment are two useful policies 
to decrease the threats posed by rival states.  Traditional realists see ‘war’ as a last 
resort. Diplomacy is a key tool for them in foreign policy. In their view, every state is 
a potential ally if strategic interests are followed. 
 The US Department of State is traditionally known as a representative of the 
traditional realist view. The State Department attribute special importance to NATO 
allies’ approval in any foreign policy step. Multilateral realism was predominant on 
US foreign policy during George H. W. Bush Administration (1988-1992). As a 
reflection of the traditional realist approach, for instance, Syria, a traditionally anti-
American country, is included in the coalition built against Saddam Hussein in 
1990.24
 In contrast to the traditional realist view, “hawkish realists” (in other words, 
“assertive nationalists”) appear as another part of the realist camp. Attributing great 
importance to military power and strategic objectives as the traditional realists, 
hawkish realists favor unilateral policies when needed, to maintain national security. 
They do not fully disregard multilateral diplomacy. Therefore their difference from 
the traditional realists is more of an issue of the emphasis. Pentagon’s civilian side is 
generally known as full of the proponents of this hawkish realism. 
 The second fundamental approach to American foreign policy is “idealism.” 
Idealism gains insight from the foreign policy principles formulated by Woodrow 
Wilson at the end of the First World War. This approach regards the US as the 
                                                 
23 Some also call them “multilateral realists.” Henry Kissinger is known as a leading figure of 
traditional realism. His book “Diplomacy” is assessing the Cold War period with such a view.  While 
translating the terms used by Tunç for these different ideological trends, generally the terms of Ivo H. 
Daalder and James M. Lindsay have been chosen in this thesis.  See Daalder and Lindsay (2003b).  
24 For a book supporting George H. W. Bush’s traditional realist approach to foreign policy, see 
Scowcroft and Bush (1999). 
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prominent actor to spread freedom and justice in the world. They believe that both 
the security of the United States and world peace can be achieved by this spread of 
‘American’ vales such as democracy and freedom. “Democratic peace theory” is a 
reflection of such idealism with the argument that ‘democracies do not fight with 
each other.’25
 Like realists, proponents of idealism are also divided into two camps: 
“democratic imperialism” and “liberal internationalism.” According to the “liberal 
internationalists,” the US should present itself as a model of democracy and freedom 
via promoting free trade and economic integration among nations. They argue that 
the US can easily spread its political and cultural values by economic and cultural 
integration. They argue that this is the real power the United States has. In other 
words, in the view of “liberal internationalists,” the US should try to spread 
democracy by using its “soft power” via economic, cultural and technological means; 
rather than the “hard power” of its military.26 According to “liberal internationalists,” 
commercial and economic integration will make states more interdependent, will 
bring the peoples closer, and thus serve to the world peace. Clinton Administration 
had such a view and thus pursued a foreign policy to promote free trade and 
economic integration in 1990s. 
 Another branch of the idealist approach to US foreign policy has a more 
active attitude towards spreading American values. According to this view, named 
“democratic imperialism,” the greatest threat against the US comes from the 
countries headed by non-democratic regimes. It does not matter whether they are 
strong or weak, they argue, these countries are potential threats to the US. Therefore 
                                                 
25 This theory appeared as a separate literature in the discipline of IR. For a discussion of this theory, 
see Ray (1995).  
26 The term “soft power” became famous after it is used by Joseph Nye (2002), a Harvard professor 
who has also worked in the Clinton Administration.  
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“democratic imperialists” assert that the US should aim to spread democracy by 
toppling the authoritarian regimes, by using military power when necessary. The 
proponents of this view in the US, has only been a minority so far. The 
neoconservative clique has been the last but the most effective representatives of this 
approach. 
 
3.3. GEORGE W. BUSH’S FOREIGN POLICY TEAM 
Proponents of the aforementioned foreign policy views have been also in George W. 
Bush’s first Administration. However, the Clintonian liberals have not been effective 
in the George W. Bush Administration, as the conservative ideology of the 
Republican Party has been dominant in it. The other three camps of foreign policy 
views have appeared at the top posts. The main posts on foreign policy making, such 
as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, were filled by representatives of 
traditional realism (Powell and Rice), while other important posts like Secretary of 
Defense, and the Vice-President were filled by proponents of hawkish realism 
(Rumsfeld and Cheney). “Democratic imperialists” (in other words, 
neoconservatives) have been situated in the second and the lower tiers of the Bush 
administration. Foreign policy ideas of top Bush officials will be examined in the 
following sections. 
  
3.3.1. COLIN POWELL 
When Colin Powell was appointed to the State Department by George W. Bush, he 
had an excellent career in the US army. (He is a Vietnam veteran with two wounds 
and half a dozen medals from that war.) He was also a very experienced statesman, 
particularly on foreign policy after his former long-standing posts in previous 
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administrations. (He was the National Security Advisor of Ronald Reagan, and the 
Commander in Chief during the first Gulf War). With this career, Powell was a very 
famous figure in the US. George W. Bush, too, expressed his admiration for Powell 
when he declared the names in his cabinet, by terming Powell as an “American 
hero.”  
Powell has a somewhat softer version of the realist foreign policy approach. 
He actually represents the majority viewpoint among realists in Republican foreign 
policy circles. Although it may seem sometimes he was isolated in the Bush White 
House, this broader base of support provided Powell with significant clout.27 This 
realist wing, including Powell, sees a world of competitive states but believe that the 
US can best achieve its aims through leadership of a multilateral system. In their 
view, this is the preferable, although not essential, method of global leadership. In 
this strategy, the soft power of US culture, politically democratic history and 
economic might can be used to influence and lead, relegating military power to one 
choice among others. 
Powell’s foreign and security policy views can be followed by the doctrine 
now remembered by his name. When Powell served as then-Defense Secretary 
Caspar Weinberger’s top military assistant, the Pentagon propounded what was 
known at the time as the “Weinberger doctrine”. This doctrine embodied the lessons 
Powell had learned from the Vietnam War. In fact, Powell later embraced the 
principles of that doctrine so thoroughly and so publicly that it is now better known 
as “Powell doctrine.” According to this doctrine, American troops should not be 
committed to combat overseas unless vital US interests are at stake, unless the US 
objectives are clearly defined and unless overwhelming force is used to achieve those 
                                                 
27 Especially the support of Bush the senior’s National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, alongside 
the support of former Secretaries of State James Baker and Lawrence Eagleburger, is of importance. 
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objectives. The ‘vital interests’ are all about national security and they include 
neither humanitarian interventions nor nation-building missions (Harris, 2004). 
  
3.3.2. CONDOLEEZZA RICE 
None of the members of George W. Bush’s foreign policy team was closer to the 
president than Condoleezza Rice, Bush’s National Security Advisor. She was a 
member of the National Security Council, responsible for Soviet and East European 
Affairs, during Bush senior Administration before serving at Stanford University as 
provost. She has been groomed by, among others, Brent Scowcroft, George H. W. 
Bush’s National Security Advisor. She is engaging, dynamic and articulate. She can 
impress crowds with good speeches with no notes. She is also devoutly religious. In 
her own words, she is a “prochoice evangelical” (Heibrunn, 1999/2000).   
 Until September 11, 2001, Condoleezza Rice was sharing Colin Powell’s 
foreign policy views generally. As regards foreign policy agenda Rice, as Powell, 
focused on big powers like Russia and China. Both Rice and Powell believed that 
national interest should determine US foreign policy. Both felt that the presence of 
US troops in lengthy US peace missions should be reduced. Both believed the United 
States should focus on acute troubleshoots where US interests are at stake; instead of 
helping rebuild a war-ravaged country. In one of her articles published during the 
Campaign 2000, named “National Interest”, Rice criticized the Clinton 
Administration that it tried to rebuild war ravaged less important countries in Bosnia 
and Kosovo, and thus gave insufficient importance to national security. 9/11 terrorist 
attacks changed her views and she became one of the main supporters of the more 
aggressive policies that Bush started to pursue after September 11. 
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 Condoleezza Rice was the closest foreign policy advisor to George W. Bush. 
She had been the leader of the “Vulcans,” Bush’s foreign policy team during his 
election campaign in 1999 and 2000.28 During Bush’s first term in presidency, not 
only she talked with Bush many times on the weekdays, but also she was often with 
the Bush family at the weekends.  
 This close relationship between George W. Bush and Condoleezza Rice was 
partly thanks to the consistency between their foreign policy views. They seem to 
share a similar view of the world. It is a balance of power, realist Republican 
approach that is generally short on details and might be summed up like this: 
strengthen America’s military, scale back military commitments abroad and focus on 
the big powers (Sciolino, 2000). And their closeness was partly backed by their 
religious stances.  
 
3.3.3. DONALD RUMSFELD 
Donald Rumsfeld has a vision to decrease the potential threats to the United States 
and to increase America’s credibility in the world. To achieve this, he believes that 
the US should pursue a proactive foreign policy and should not hesitate to take risks. 
In Rumsfeld’s view, in case of a serious threat to US national security, it is not 
inconvenient for the United States to launch a unilateral military intervention without 
the approval of its allies. However, he supports military interventions only under 
serious threats. He does not share the ideals to spread democracy or to export 
American values abroad. Because, in his view, those ideals are not only unnecessary 
but also dangerous since it may cause harmful consequences for America’s security. 
                                                 
28 The name “Vulcans” come from the ancient god of the forge, whose statute is a symbol of 
Birmingham, Ala., Ms. Rice’s hometown. 
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 Rumsfeld’s main area of interest is his objective to reform American military 
and to transform the Pentagon bureaucracy. He believes that it is no more the time of 
pitched battles, thus new American military should be organized for fights against 
terrorism and missiles. He planned a dynamic military, which could mobilize and 
reach points of crises in a very short time limit. In this way, the US will be able to 
decrease its military presence in various parts of the world. In Rumsfeld’s view, 
military presence abroad is not very efficient. This is not only because of the fact that 
those military bases abroad are very expensive, but also they make the US dependent 
on its allies.  Before September 11, Rumsfeld had anticipated a surprise attack 
against the US either from a rogue state like North Korea, or from terrorists. And he 
had proposed, thus, the US to immediately focus on a missile shield to protect US 
soil, which will destroy the offensive missiles on the air, before hitting its target 
(Defenselink, n.d.; see also Wikipedia, n.d.b and Tunç, 2004: 59-61). 
 
3.3.4. DICK CHENEY 
In the Bush Administration, Vice-President Cheney held the closest set of foreign 
policy ideas to the ones of Donald Rumsfeld. Both Cheney and Rumsfeld favored a 
more aggressive foreign policy for the US. For instance, both Cheney and Rumsfeld 
supported the idea of pursuing a more aggressive containment policy against Iraq 
even before 9/11 terrorist attacks. Also, both Cheney and Rumsfeld agreed with the 
traditional realists on the need for the US to avoid nation-building and peace 
enforcement missions. In their views, the main focus of attention should be turned 
towards the big powers like China and Russia, and also to ‘rogue’ states like North 
Korea. Though removing Saddam regime from power was a desirable end for both of 
these two close friends (they have had a decades-long friendship), in their views, Iraq 
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was a problem among the many in terms of foreign policy and a full-fledged invasion 
of Iraq should be the last alternative.  
Cheney was the person who had a strong trust of the President George W. 
Bush. Because of his 25 years-long experiences in American politics and his 
excellent knowledge of the US bureaucracy and the Congress, he became among the 
few who advised Bush on political issues. Therefore the sources close to the White 
House even claimed Cheney to be among the strongest Vice-Presidents in the 
American history. When Bush told to a Republican Senator to assume Cheney’s 
words as if Bush himself told them, this also demonstrated Bush’s level of trust for 
Cheney. Cheney was also known to be effective in the appointments of Rumsfeld 
and Wolfowitz to Pentagon (Wikipedia, n.d.a; see also Rightweb, n.d.c and Tunç, 
2004: 61-62). 
Cheney was among the few, who had taken the threat of weapons of mass 
destruction into serious consideration before September 11. When Bush 
Administration has taken the decision to establish an Office for National 
Preparedness within the framework of the fight against terrorism, Cheney’s office 
carried out the necessary procedures. And later sitting in the presidential bunker deep 
beneath the White House in the hours after the attacks on Washington and New 
York, Cheney would reflect his increased concern about WMDs with the words “as 
unfathomable as this was, it could have been so much worse if they had weapons of 
mass destruction” (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003b: 119).  
 
3.4. WHO PULLED THE FOREIGN POLICY STRINGS? 
Did the neocons take over the American political system in a coup-like fashion and 
waged two wars in two years? How much do this claim reflect reality? The idea that 
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US politics is under the tight control of a closely-knit group seems to be nothing 
more than a superficial exaggeration. The making of foreign and security policies in 
the US is a product of consultation and many times bargaining among the top 
officials of the administration. And the last word is often that of the President. All 
these politicians do not ignore the internal and the international conjuncture while 
making the decisions. The president, possibly, has to think also about the next 
elections to have a second term. All these determinants help shape the US foreign 
and security policies. Therefore, the neocons have not pulled all the strings from the 
very beginning of the first George W. Bush Administration. However, this is not to 
say that the neocons have not become effective on US foreign policy. On the 
contrary, they have had their highest influence in their history after September 11.  
By outlining the constitutional powers and ideological trends in current 
American politics, and thus, by demonstrating that it is difficult for an ideological 
group to acquire full control on US foreign policy, this chapter refused the claim that 
neocons acquired control of the US decision making with a “coup-like take over.” In 
fact, a bureaucratic system with long-lasting legislative rules, various ideological 
trends with massive public support, and key foreign policy actors situated in the top 
posts of the Administration, who may not want to give the foreign policy strings to 
others easily, would create difficulties for the neocons in realizing their foreign 
policy proposals. Nevertheless, September 11 would come up with opportunities for 
the neocons to have an influence on US security policies. And this is the topic of the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
SEPTEMBER 11 AND 
 THE NEOCONSERVATIVE INFLUENCE  
 
 
This chapter assesses the role of neoconservative ideas on Bush’s security policies 
and analyzes how the neoconservative ideas came to conform US foreign and 
security policies, in the context of which the role of September 11 attracts attention. 
The chapter firstly compares the neoconservative ideas and Bush’s security policies. 
In this context, some neoconservative documents, where the neoconservative foreign 
policy proposals were articulated, are compared with the National Security Strategy 
(2002) of the Bush Administration. By demonstrating that neocon ideas began to 
play a determining role to a great extent after September 11, 2001, and not before 
that time, the chapter will emphasize the role of September 11, as a material factor, 
which had political and psychological effects within the US as well as on the 
international context, to help neocon ideas shape George W. Bush’s post-September 
11 security policies.  
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September 11 tragedy made Bush’s foreign policy team to think of a need for 
a new security policy paradigm, and the neocon ideas helped determine what kind of 
a policy formulation would be adopted. In other words, the ideational (neocon ideas) 
held the ground to shape the policy, with the stimulus of the material (September 11). 
None of the roles of the two (ideational and material realms) can be ignored in terms 
of analysis.  
 
4.1. FIRST EIGHT MONTHS: NEOCONSERVATIVE INFLUENCE? 
The neoconservative ideas were not much effective in determining US foreign policy 
during the first eight months of the Bush Administration. Instead, a mixture of 
traditional realist and hard-line conservative ideas (by just reflecting the composition 
of the top tier of the Bush Administration) guided George W. Bush’s foreign and 
security policies prior to September 11 (Mead, 2002: 308). 
During his presidential campaign, Mr. Bush outlined his foreign policy 
approach, which he named “A Distinctly American Internationalism," at Ronald 
Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California, on November 19, 1999. His 
speech included promises that if he was the president, he would “develop and deploy 
missile defense systems – both theater and national” and also he would “never place 
troops under U.N. command.”  But most important about this speech was that Bush 
pointed at the two Eurasian powers, China and Russia, as the main concern of the 
American foreign policy agenda. He asserted “Our first order of business is the 
national security of our nation” and talked about the risks of a rising China and the 
nuclear capabilities of Russia at nearly half of his speech (Bush, 1999).  
In fact, foreign policy was not the top priority during his presidential 
campaign. Instead, during the campaign he mainly focused on a $1.6 trillion tax cut 
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and an education reform (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003a: 110). And in the first eight 
months in office, Bush followed the policies he promised, which does not include 
major foreign policy initiatives that the neocons might have expected Bush to 
undertake. Though world affairs had not been on the top of Bush’s campaign agenda 
in 2000, neoconservatives might well have expected him to turn the defense budget 
tap wide open, to move aggressively on regime change in Iraq, a rapid withdrawal 
from the ABM Treaty and a new Manhattan Project to build a missile defense shield. 
Bush’s policies in its first eight months were to disappoint the neoconservatives. And 
the neocons in academia, naturally, criticized the Administration for these policies in 
their writings (PBS, n.d.).  
 Disappointing the neoconservatives, and in favor of the traditional realist 
flank in the Administration, Bush took a reluctant approach to undertake major 
foreign policy initiatives in his first eight months in office. In early February 2001, 
Bush told members of Congress “there will be no new money for defense this year” 
(Daalder and Lindsay, 2003b: 63). And he decided to proceed with the Clinton 
Administration’s proposed 2002 defense budget request of $310 billion. He also 
declined to seek a supplemental appropriation to add more funds to the 2001 
budget.29 Bush, with a similar approach, neither withdrew from the ABM Treaty 
immediately, nor ordered rapid construction of a system capable of defending the US 
from ballistic missiles. Powell announced in February 2001 that the US would not 
remove its troops from Bosnia or Kosovo without the agreement of the NATO allies. 
During his first eight months Bush offered no concrete plans for resolving the 
                                                 
29 Bush’s decision to stick with Clinton’s defense budget proposals infuriated defense hawks on 
Capitol Hill, and they quickly moved to open the spending tap. Rather than being trumped by the 
Congress, the White House changed its tune. By August 2001, Bush submitted a 2001 defense 
appropriation request and raised the 2002 defense budget request to 343.3 billion. This showed that 
Bush was not above reversing course to accommodate domestic political realities. (Daalder and 
Lindsay, 2003a: 114; see also Daalder and Lindsay, 2003b: 71-72). 
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outstanding issues in US-Mexican relations. Bush also did not move ahead 
aggressively on a policy of regime change in Iraq, either through direct US action or 
by empowering Iraqi exile groups to do so on America’s behalf. Instead, the 
Administration moved to replace the existing Iraqi sanctions with so-called ‘smart’ 
ones that expedited trade in civilian goods but tightened controls on military goods 
(Daalder and Lindsay, 2003b: 62-77). 
 Besides these, in the first eight months of his presidency, Bush also pursued 
some policies in favor of the hard-line conservative flank in the Administration. In 
March 2001, Bush announced his decision to abandon Kyoto Protocol on curtailing 
emissions of carbon dioxide from power plants, which was taken because of internal 
considerations. In this respect Bush argued “idea of placing caps on CO2 does not 
make economic sense for America” (White House, 2001). His opposition followed 
by some other international agreements among them: a pact to control trafficking 
small arms, a new protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention, the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the International Criminal Court. Bush’s 
staunch posture in opposing the above mentioned international agreements, despite 
the increasing complaints abroad, might have well been favorable also for the 
neoconservatives, besides the hard-line conservatives in the Bush Administration. 
However, this does not actually be interpreted as the production of a pure 
neoconservative influence. In fact, there have been a closeness between the ideas of 
neocons and the hard-line conservatives in the Administration, and this marriage of 
ideas between them made each groups’ converging proposals stronger in the 
decision-making process before and after September 11.  
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4.2. SEPTEMBER 11 AS A MATERIAL FACTOR 
With its political and psychological effects within and outside the United States, the 
September 11 tragedy, as a material factor on its own, paved the way to 
neoconservative ideas to be effective in the determination of Bush Administration’s 
post-September 11 security policies. Firstly, it can be argued that 9/11 transformed 
the views of the US administrative elite about world politics and this, in turn, had an 
important role in changing the US foreign policy after September 11. And secondly, 
9/11’s psychological impacts on both the US and the world public opinion had a 
significant role in the creation of an appropriate political atmosphere to give the 
opportunity to Bush and his aides to adopt more aggressive foreign and security 
policies after September 11.  
The political impacts of September 11 were remarkable both within and 
outside the United States. September 11 came with nearly 3000 deaths and a great 
shock on both the administrative elite and the citizens of the US. The US moved fast 
to keep the terrorist network Al-Qaeda responsible for the attacks. Many states 
condemned terrorism and expressed support for the US against that terrorist network. 
US citizens gave massive support to their Administration to find and punish the 
people who are responsible for this tragedy. Democrats were silent since they 
hesitated to raise a great opposition to the government in those dreadful days of the 
country, especially when the Administration had a massive support of the public. As 
long as Bush’s policies produced success abroad, or at least did not obviously fail, 
Congress was not about to stand in his way (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003b: 80). With 
all these internal and external impacts, the atmosphere inside the United States as 
well as the international context after September 11 constituted an opportunity for 
the Bush Administration to undertake major foreign and security policy initiatives. 
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September 11 also had psychological effects on the administrative elite and 
citizens in the US. The new foreign policy stance of the US was not only a 
production of the realist calculation to take the advantage of 9/11, and thus try to 
‘maximize the US national interests,’ as it can be interpreted according to the IR 
theory of realism. Instead, the US public’s acceptance of Bush junior’s more 
aggressive security policies after September 11, should be regarded as a reaction of 
the US to 9/11, with its citizens and the administrative elite, who experienced such a 
dreadful event on their soil firstly after Pearl Harbor surprise attacks. The following 
few paragraphs will explain the horror US faced during and after September 11, in 
order to better grasp the psychological impacts of September 11 on the people of the 
United States.  
With its citizens and the administrative elite, the US felt a real horror on and 
after September 11. George W. Bush was on the way out of the White House by 
Airforce-1 for security reasons, when another plane was directed on the White House 
as a target. Cheney took refuge in the presidential bunker deep beneath the White 
House in the hours after the attacks on New York and Washington, expressing his 
anxiety of a far more lethal terrorist attack using radiological, biological, or even 
nuclear weapons as possible: “As unfathomable as this was, it could have been so 
much worse if they had weapons of mass destruction” (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003b: 
118). It is not hard to guess what the Pentagon staff felt when the plane hit on one of 
the blocks on their site. Many US citizens lost their relatives or friends on the twin 
towers on that tragic day, and far more others watched the tragedy on TV for months.  
The anthrax attacks in the fall of 2001 and the relevant intelligence 
information implying terrorists’ approach to weapons of mass destruction, increased 
the concerns of the Bush Administration and the US public about biological 
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terrorism. Three weeks after September 11, Robert Stevens, an editor at the Sun, a 
weekly supermarket tabloid in Boca Raton, Florida, died of inhalation anthrax. It was 
the first reported case of anthrax since 1976 and one of only eighteen cases in the 
previous century.  Over the next two weeks envelopes, containing a sophisticated 
form of anthrax, were received by news organizations and the offices of two 
Democratic senators. The anthrax mailings, which ultimately infected eighteen 
people and killed five of them, and the panic they caused in the country even if they 
failed to kill many people; demonstrated the ease with which a highly lethal attack 
could be launched and also the ease to create panic in the country (Daalder and 
Lindsay, 2003b: 118). 
By the late October, 2001, US intelligence was picking up rumours of another 
terrorist attack, possibly involving a so-called dirty bomb, radiological material 
wrapped around a conventional explosive. Although a dirty bomb would be nowhere 
near as lethal as a nuclear bomb, it could release significant amounts of radiation in 
the air. Depending on the amount and type of radiological material involved, a dirty 
bomb could contaminate a large part of a major city and create wholesale panic. Such 
an attack, Condoleezza Rice mentioned, would “make Sept. 11 look like child’s 
play” (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003b: 118).  
After all these events, the US public became much more concerned about 
their security and the Administration’s risk perceptions were changed. The Bush 
officials, then, started to take every single intelligence rumor on terrorism into 
consideration seriously.  
Other than the political and psychological impacts inside and outside the US 
mentioned above, September 11 also had an impact on Bush Administration’s view 
about world politics, which was in turn reflected to the security policies of the Bush 
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Administration. Firstly, September 11 heightened Bush Administration’s threat 
perceptions. September 11 “produced an acute sense of our vulnerability,” said Rice. 
“The coalition did not act in Iraq,” explained Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 
“because we had discovered new evidence of Iraq’s pursuit of WMD; we acted 
because we saw the existing evidence in a new light – through the prism of our 
experience on 9/11.” Having failed to foresee and prevent a terrorist attack before 
September 11, the Administration’s threshold for risk was dramatically lowered, its 
temptation to use force remarkably heightened (Lefler, 2004: 24-25). 
The tragedy on September 11 brought about a climate where fundamental 
policy changes were widely discussed, and the clique which had a ready-made 
strategy was the neoconservative one. By the impact of September 11, US decision 
makers thought that it was necessary to question or rethink the foundations of foreign 
policy. Realist, libertarian, or left-liberal institutes or experts had no ready-made 
strategic plans to pull out of the drawer to propose as an alternative action plan for 
the US Administration to be followed in the newly established conjuncture after 
September 11. They also lacked access to the Administration, which, with all its 
divisions in other matters, was united after September 11 in the belief that old 
strategies, especially the policy of containment, could not cope with the new threats 
(Greve, 2004). The neocons had been concerned for years with new threats and had 
been arguing for a new foreign policy vis-à-vis individual countries and regions, and 
thus, September 11 raised the stock of neoconservatives within the Republican Party.  
Since neocons had focused more on the threats posed by the so-called “rogue 
states” before September 11 than the threats posed by terrorism, they were not 
directly confirmed by 9/11 (Greve, 2004).  The neocons nevertheless had an analysis 
of what had gone wrong in American foreign policy. They also stood ready with 
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proposals for what to do: to wage war on the terror groups and to seek to end or 
transform governments that harbored them, especially those possessing the means to 
furnish terrorists with the ability to kill even more Americans than on 9/11. Neocons 
also proposed a long-term strategy, which is called “Greater Middle East Project,”30 
for making the Middle East less of a hotbed of terrorism: implanting democracy in 
the region and thereby helping to foment a less violent approach to politics 
(Muravchick, 2003: 33-34). And as a result, their proposals were highly embraced by 
the Bush Administration.  
 
4.3. AFTER SEPTEMBER 11: BUSH JUNIOR’S RHETORIC 
The changes in the Bush Administration’s thinking and rhetoric after the 9/11 attacks 
were striking. Soon after September 11 Bush junior started to borrow, to a great 
extent, from neoconservative ideas in his public pronouncements. In accordance with 
the set of neoconservative ideas, he declared a total war on international terrorism. 
Soon after the 9/11 attacks, foreign policy, or more precisely war on terrorism, 
became the defining mission of his presidency (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003b: 80). In 
an address to the US Congress on September 26, 2001, Bush told his nation that they 
should expect a long and unprecedented war, aimed at uprooting terrorism once for 
all (Arı, 2004: 495). And he gave a firm message to other nations warning them “[in 
this war on terrorism] you are either with us or with the terrorists” (Bush, 2001).  
“Our nation will continue to be steadfast, and patient and persistent in the 
pursuit of two great objectives,” Bush declared in his famous State of the Union 
address he delivered to Congress in January 2002, “First, we will shut down terrorist 
                                                 
30 The Greater Middle East Project, proposed by the Bush Administration after September 11, has the 
goal to give an end to the factors which -the US administrative elite thought- helps terrorism to 
flourish in the region laid at the arc of countries extending from Morocco to Pakistan. The method 
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camps, disrupt terrorist plans and bring terrorists to justice. And second, we must 
prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons 
from threatening the United States and the world” (Bush, 2002). Naming North 
Korea, Iran and Iraq as such regimes, Bush continued “States like these, and their 
terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world” 
(Bush, 2002).  
Bush, in his speeches, also gave signs of United States’ adoption of the policy 
of preemption as a way to counter terrorism. “And all nations should know” Bush 
boldly declared in his State of the Union Address on January 2002, “America will do 
what is necessary to ensure our nation's security. We'll be deliberate, yet time is not 
on our side.  I will not wait on events, while dangers gather.  I will not stand by, as 
peril draws closer and closer.  The United States of America will not permit the 
world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive 
weapons” (Bush, 2002).   
Bush’s rhetoric after September 11 have more or less the same underlying 
logic with the neocons’ about how America should act in the world. This logic rests 
on five basic elements. First, the United States lives in a dangerous world. One of 
Bush’s previous statements reflects this way of thinking about world politics: “This 
is still a world of terror and missiles and madmen” (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003a: 
107).  
Second, self-interested nation-states are key actors in world politics. This 
element is interesting because Bush’s claim about even a stateless act, terrorism, was 
that it is sponsored and flourished by states – namely the so-called “rogue states.” 
“We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and 
                                                                                                                                          
was the spread of democracy and the transformation of the societies in the region. The Project had its 
first targets in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
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those who harbor them,” Bush declared the night of the attacks, in a statement now 
remembered as enunciating the Bush Doctrine (in other words, the National Security 
Strategy of the US). Days later, Wolfowitz pledged that the United States would 
focus on “removing the sanctuaries, removing the support systems, ending states who 
sponsor terrorism.” The link between terrorist organizations and state sponsors 
became the “principle strategic thought underlying our strategy in the war on 
terrorism,” said Douglas Feith, a neocon and the number three official in the 
Pentagon during the first Bush Administration (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003a: 119-
120). Bush would later express also, “Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in 
the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread 
throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning.” And he 
would continue “So long as training camps operate, so long as nations harbor 
terrorists, freedom is at risk and America and our allies must not, and will not, allow 
it” (Bush, 2002).  
The third element is power, especially military power, which is seen as the 
coin of the realm even in a globalized world. Fourth, multilateral institutions and 
agreements are neither essential nor necessarily conducive to American interests. 
And the last element is that the United States is a unique power, and others see it so 
(Daalder and Lindsay, 2003a: 106-108). 
9/11 elevated the focus on ideals and suppressed the careful calculation of 
interest in Bush’s rhetoric. In search of eliminating, or at least lowering, terrorism 
from its source, which is said to be the “rough states,” the Bush team adopted a 
policy to spread American values abroad, and firstly to the “Broader Middle East.” 
However, before September 11, the Bush team prided itself on a foreign policy that 
embraced realism. Then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice boldly 
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declared during the 2000 presidential campaign that American power should not be 
employed for “second order” effects, such as the enhancement of humanity’s well-
being. Bush claimed that freedom, democracy, and peace would follow from the 
concerted pursuit of the United States’ “enduring national interests.” This foreign 
policy would reflect America’s character, “The modesty of true strength. The 
humility of real greatness” (Bush, 1999).  
Bush Administration’s planned configuration of foreign policy has faced 
changes after that tragic day. September 11 added “values” to this configuration of 
foreign policy in the strategy paper released in 2002. The National Security Strategy 
(NSS) states under the sub-title of  “Overview of America’s International Security,” 
“The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American 
internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our interests” (NSC, 2002: 
1; emphasis added). The overall goal of the US foreign policy, said the Bush NSS of 
September 2002, is to configure a balance of power favoring freedom. “Our 
principles,” says the strategy paper – besides national interests - will “guide our 
government’s decisions about international cooperation … they will guide our 
actions and our words in international bodies” (NSC, 2002: 4). The strategy 
statement also declares “… the national security strategy of the United States must 
start from these core beliefs and look outward for possibilities to expand liberty” 
(NSC, 2002: 3; emphasis added).  
It may come to minds that in times of crisis, U.S. political leaders have long 
asserted values and ideals to evoke public support for the mobilization of power. 
However, this shift was more than rhetoric. The terrorist attacks against World Trade 
Center and Pentagon transformed the Bush Administration’s sense of danger and 
impelled offensive strategies (Lefler, 2004: 24-25). And within the framework of the 
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values and ideals expressed, the US waged two wars in two years following the 9/11 
tragedy. The NSS, besides revealing the will of the Bush Administration to expand 
liberty (NSC, 2002: 3), would evaluate the outcome of the Afghan war with its own 
words “Afghanistan has been liberated” (NSC, 2002: 5). 
  
4.4. AFTER SEPTEMBER 11: NEOCON IDEAS AND US SECURITY 
STRATEGY 
No neoconservative was elevated in office after 9/11, but policies espoused by 
neoconservatives were highly embraced by the Bush Administration since then. The 
neoconservative style formulation of the new security strategy of the Bush 
Administration was revealed after the release of the new National Security Strategy 
in September 2002. It looked like a neocon manifesto. As self-expressed neocon Max 
Boot also evaluates “(t)he ambitious National Security Strategy that the 
administration issued in September 2002 - with its call for U.S. supremacy, the 
promotion of democracy, and vigorous action, preemptive if necessary, to stop 
terrorism and weapons proliferation - was a quintessentially neoconservative 
document” (Boot, 2004b: 20-21). What was new on the NSS in comparison with the 
decades-old neoconservative foreign policy ideas, was the emphasis on international 
terrorism, which seems to be used as a justification for the long-lasting foreign policy 
proposals of the neoconservatives. There were great consistencies between the NSS 
and the decades-long defended neocon theses, which are also expressed 
systematically in various neocon documents such as Wolfowitz’s controversial 1992 
Draft Defense Planning Guidance, which called for US military dominance over 
Eurasia and preemptive strikes against countries suspected of developing weapons of 
mass destruction (New York Times, 1992, emphasis added; see also Gellman, 1992 
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and Tyler, 1992), and the 2002 PNAC Report “Rebuilding America’s Defenses: 
Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century” (PNAC, 2000).   
The first consistency between them is the hegemonic view, which dominates 
all these documents. The NSS makes it clear - just as both of the neocon documents 
mentioned above - “our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential 
adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, 
the power of the United States” (NSC, 2002: 30; emphasis added). The NSS also 
declares “It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength. We 
must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge” (NSC, 2002: 29; emphasis 
added). The 1992 Draft had a resembling argument emphasizing:  
 
Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a rival. This is a dominant 
consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that 
we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose 
resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global 
power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the 
former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia. 
There are three additional aspects to this objective: First the US must 
show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds 
the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a 
greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate 
interests. Second, in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the 
interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from 
challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and 
economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring 
potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role 
(New York Times, 1992; emphases added). 
 
“Rebuilding America’s Defenses” was another document, analyzing the military 
requirements for an American hegemony in the world. To this end, it mentioned the 
need to “shape the security environment in critical regions,” “maintain nuclear 
strategic superiority, basing the US nuclear deterrent upon a global, nuclear net 
assessment that weighs the full range of current and emerging threats, not merely the 
U.S.-Russia balance,” “develop and deploy global missile defenses … to provide a 
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secure basis for U.S. power projection around the world” and to “reposition US 
forces to respond to 21st century strategic realities.”  
It may come to minds that “Rebuilding America’s Defenses” is a military-
strategic evaluation paper, and such military papers in every state are, naturally, 
prepared by taking the worst possible scenarios into account in their analyses to 
protect their countries from others’ attacks. However, “Rebuilding America’s 
Defenses” is different than any other military-strategic evaluation paper, because it 
focuses not only on the protection of a country, but also on the ways to have and 
maintain the hegemony of the sole superpower in the world.   
The second resemblance of the NSS to neocon documents was its focus on 
the need to promote American values abroad. The NSS mentioned “The U.S. 
national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that 
reflects the union of our values and our national interests.” (NSC, 2002: 1; emphasis 
added). “In pursuit of our goals, our first imperative is to clarify what we stand for: 
the United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right 
and true for all people everywhere. No nation owns these aspirations and no nation is 
exempt from them. … the national security strategy of the United States must start 
from these core beliefs and look outwards for possibilities to expand liberty” (NSC, 
2002: 3; emphasis added). 
1992 Draft had similar arguments. According to the 1992 Draft Document, 
the US should aim “to address sources of regional conflict and instability in such a 
way as to promote increasing respect for international law, limit international 
violence, and encourage the spread of democratic forms of government and open 
economic systems” (New York Times, 1992; emphasis added). 
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The third main resemblance between the NSS and the neocon ideas is the 
emphasis on unilateral and preemptive actions. The NSS declares “While the United 
States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we 
will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right to self-defense by 
acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against 
our people and our country” (NSC, 2002: 6; emphases added). 1992 Draft also 
contemplates the use of American military power to preempt or punish use of 
nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, “even in conflicts that otherwise do not 
directly engage U.S. interests.” Preemption has been favored by many neocons as a 
foreign policy instrument for a long time. It was also a recommendation of Perle and 
seven other neocons in their report for Israeli Likud Party leader Benjamin 
Netanyahu in 1996, which urged Israel to take a more aggressive posture - shifting to 
a “principle of preemption, rather than retaliation alone” (Kosterlitz, 2003). 
1992 Draft Document mentioned that if necessary, the United States must be 
prepared to take unilateral action. The document states the coalitions “hold 
considerable promise for promoting collective action,” but it also states the US 
“should expect future coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies” formed to deal with a 
particular crisis and which may not outlive the resolution of the crisis. The document 
states that what is most important is “the sense that the world order is ultimately 
backed by the U.S.” and that “the United States should be postured to act 
independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated” or in a crisis that calls 
for quick response (New York Times, 1992). 
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4.5. AFTER SEPTEMBER 11: NEOCON IDEAS AND US SECURITY 
POLICY 
The first George W. Bush Administration took mainly two important security policy 
steps after September 11: Afghan war (2001), and the Iraq war (2003). These two 
wars, especially the war in Iraq, augmented the discussions about the neocon 
influence on the Bush Administration.  
Even after 9/11, the neocons were effective as much as they could convince 
their colleagues in the Administration. Not all of their proposals, but only the ones 
Bush and his other top aides are convinced to undertake, were adopted by the Bush 
Administration. Wolfowitz’s suggestion, short after 9/11, to engage with the Iraqi 
regime before the one in Afghanistan, was an example to this situation in the 
Administration. Just four days after September 11, Wolfowitz had proposed in a 
meeting of Bush’s war council, convened to discuss the response to 9/11 at Camp 
David, that a war in Afghanistan was risky and stability would be difficult to achieve 
once Taliban was ousted; terrorism laid elsewhere and Iraq should be dealt firstly 
since Saddam’s regime could be easily overthrown. “Wolfowitz seized the 
opportunity,” Bob Woodward writes “[a]ttacking Afghanistan would be uncertain. 
He worried about 100,000 American troops bogged down in mountain fighting in 
Afghanistan six months from then. In contrast, Iraq was a brittle, oppressive regime 
that might break easily. It was doable. He estimated that there was a 10 to 50 percent 
chance Saddam was involved in the September 11 terrorist attacks” (Quoted in 
Geyer, 2003). There was little support for Wolfowitz’s argument except his superior 
Rumsfeld’s (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003b: 104). Woodward continues “They would 
need successes early in any war to maintain domestic and international support.” And 
Rumsfeld was “deeply worried about the availability of good targets in Afghanistan” 
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(Quoted in Geyer, 2003). At last, despite this call of Wolfowitz on dealing with Iraq 
first, as a consequence, the Bush Administration took the decision to firstly deal with 
Afghanistan.  
The neocon influence on the Bush Administration, however, started to be 
realized in increasing levels day by day after September 11. Soon after that meeting 
at Camp David, Bush began to a great extent borrowing from neoconservative 
arguments about how the United States should reposition itself in the world and use 
its unprecedented power. Rather than only seeking vengeance against Al Qaeda, 
Bush declared a total war on international terrorism. And “rather than treating 
terrorism as a matter of policing renegade organizations and lobbing the occasional 
retaliatory missile” (Kosterlitz, 2003) as past Administrations had done, Bush 
adopted the neoconservative view that countering terrorism meant waging war 
against governments that harbor them. Therefore, the goal of the US war in 
Afghanistan was not merely to destroy Al Qaeda but to topple the Taliban regime, 
which had welcomed bin Laden’s terrorist training camps (Kosterlitz, 2003). 
 Regarding the issue of the neocon influence on the Bush Administration, the 
war in Iraq (2003) appeared to be more controversial than the one in Afghanistan. 
Afghanistan was a first reaction to September 11. George W. Bush wrote to his diary 
at the night of September the 11th, 2001, that what happened that day was the Pearl 
Harbour of the 21th century (Woodward, 2004: 25). A Democrat Administration 
would also likely have proceeded militarily against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan as Bush 
Administration did, but it would not have declared and carried out a forcible regime 
change in Iraq as part of the fight against terrorism (Greve, 2004). Therefore, 
especially the Iraq war augmented discussions about the neocon influence on Bush 
policies.  
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When the alleged reasons of the Bush Administration before going to war 
with Iraq revealed to be misleading short after the war, the focus were directed more 
on the neocon weight in the Bush Administration. Bush publicly declared mainly 
three aims for the war against Iraq: “(1) to eliminate Saddam’s WMD arsenals; (2) to 
diminish the threat of international terrorism; and (3) to promote democracy in Iraq 
and the surrounding areas” (Klare, 2003). These reasons no more seemed to be 
credible short after the war because (1) CIA intelligence about Saddam regime’s 
WMDs were proved to be wrong short after the toppling of Saddam’s regime and the 
Bush Administration had to accept this by the public statements of its high level 
officials; (2) Saddam’s link with neither 9/11 attacks nor Al-Qaeda could be backed 
by persuasive evidence by the US; (3) the discourse on bringing democracy to 
Middle East seemed to be a distant objective for that region, especially when the 
long-lasting resistance and terror in Iraq revealed that Iraqi people were hesitant 
about what this US Administration tries to bring them by force. 
Toppling Saddam regime have, for a long time, been on the top of the 
neoconservative agenda and several of the authors of the neocon documents, 
proposing insistently for a regime change in Iraq, were in influential posts joining the 
discussions of the top Bush officials about foreign and security policies within the 
Bush Administration (Woodward, 2004: 51-52), when it waged war against Iraq in 
2003. 
The neocons had insistently proposed for a regime change in Iraq, but without 
clarifying how to reach it. Richard Perle, one of the most high profile 
neoconservatives who resigned as chairman of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board 
in 2003, mentioned in an interview that he had first demanded Saddam’s ouster in 
1987, shortly after he had left the Defense Department and well before Iraq invaded 
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Kuwait. Perle’s view was shaped by “the nature of the regime and Saddam’s 
ambitions” which, Perle argued, “became evident when he invaded Kuwait” 
(Kosterlitz, 2003).  
The neocon calls for toppling Saddam accelerated over time. In 1997, 
Afghan-born neoconservative Zalmay Khalilzad, a foreign policy adviser in the 
Reagan Administration and a special envoy of George W. Bush to Afghanistan and 
Iraq, made the case with Wolfowitz for Saddam’s ouster in a Weekly Standard 
article, “Overthrow Him.” And in early 1998, an open letter to President Clinton, by 
the neoconservative think tank PNAC, spelled out a plan for squeezing out Saddam 
and recognizing a “provisional government … representative of all the peoples of 
Iraq” (PNAC, 1998). Signatories included a number of people who became later part 
of the Bush Administration later: Wolfowitz, Khalilzad, Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Undersecretary of State for 
Arms Control and International Security John Bolton, Undersecretary of Defense 
(comptroller) Dov Zakheim, and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas 
Feith. 
Some of the neoconservatives, including Perle, envisioned regime change in 
Iraq as part of a fundamental transformation of the entire Middle East. In 1996, Perle 
and seven other neocons drafted a white paper for Benjamin Netanyahu, who was the 
incoming Prime Minister of Israel and leader of its Likud Party. The goals of that 
report included “removing Saddam Hussein from power” and “weakening, 
containing, and even rolling back Syria” (Kosterlitz, 2003: 1544).31 After years-long 
neocon calls for toppling Saddam regime, this ouster was finally realized in 2003, 
when the neocons were in important posts in the US Administration.  
                                                 
31 It is interesting today to witness the attempts on the realization of the latter proposal by the second 
Bush junior administration, after the realization of the former during his first term. 
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In conclusion, there are full of elements to be borrowed from the 
neoconservative ideas in the National Security Strategy (2002) and also in George 
W. Bush’s post-September 11 speeches. Also the policies Bush implemented after 
September 11 fit to a great extent with the decades-old neoconservative ideals in 
terms of foreign policy. All these clues, in the last analyses, are convincing enough to 
believe on a high degree of neoconservative influence on the determination of Bush’s 
post-September 11 security policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
78
  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
A MIXTURE OF IDEATIONAL  
AND MATERIAL FACTORS 
 
 
 
This thesis has argued that neocon ideas became effective in determining the post-
September 11 foreign policy stance of the Bush Administration only after September 
11's terrorist attacks, which produced an appropriate psychological and political 
ground for the operation of neocon ideas.   
Wars waged by the US following 9/11 focused world public attention on 
neoconservatives within the Bush Administration - the war in Iraq, especially, had 
long and insistently been proposed by prominent neoconsevatives, ultimately taking 
place when these neocons occupied second and third tiers of the Bush 
Administration. Although, so far, neoconservative ideas represent only a minority in 
American politics, and although, to date, this minority retains an insignificant voter 
support within the US population, this numerically insubstantial minority comprises 
an important and well-connected network within American society - containing, as it 
does, active members in influential think tanks, politics and media. When Dick 
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Cheney placed many prominent neoconservatives in the second and lower levels of 
the Bush Administration, this minority acquired further clout in the form of 
opportunities for making their voices heard, alongside those of their superiors, in the 
country's highest level policy-making discussions.  
The existence of neoconservatives within Bush's Administration prior to and 
during September 11's attacks meant both alternative policy options and ready 
support for a “new foreign policy paradigm” to replace the “demonstrable failure of 
the old.” To this extent, then, neoconservative ideas had a significant role in shaping 
Bush’s post-September 11 security policies. The National Security Strategy, released 
by the Bush Administration in September 2002, and Bush’s post-September 11 
speeches, which mostly reflect the essence of that document, possess a highly 
neoconservative tone. Bush’s security policies after 9/11, especially war in Iraq, 
seem to be the realization of neocon policy proposals. 
Arguing a high degree of neocon influence, this thesis does not deny the role 
of September 11, as a material factor on its own, on Bush’s post-September 11 
security policies. September 11, in fact, with the conditions it produced, impacted the 
formulation of Bush’s post-September 11 security policies.  First, and perhaps 
foremost, 9/11 induced Bush’s top foreign policy team to consider the efficacy of the 
US's foreign policy paradigm against heightened threat perceptions ensuing from the 
9/11 tragedy. Secondly, September 11 created an appropriate psychological and 
political atmosphere both within and without the United States for the 
implementation of a new foreign policy paradigm, effectively facilitating both the 
renunciation and replacement of the prior one.   
In fact, neither the influence of neoconservative ideas on the Bush 
Administration, nor the events and consequences of September 11, were the only 
 
 
80
ideational and material factors, respectively, that motivated post-9/11 foreign and 
security policy changes.  Political outcomes are, in many cases, complex and, thus, 
ultimately incapable of reduction to two causal factors.  Such reduction, however, 
represents an inescapable exigency of much analysis - in effect, the tool making 
analysis possible.   
While the Afghan war perhaps represented the US’s reaction to the events of 
9/11 - that is, to the threatening violence of a successful terrorist attack occurring on 
US soil and unparalleled in scale since that of Pearl Harbour, several supplemental 
factors also contributed to the materialization of subsequent Bush policies.  
First, Iraq was an ongoing problem according to George W. Bush, who 
believed Iraq needed handling in one way or another. After a year of Bush 
Administration to tidy up the situation in Iraq, which is believed to be worsening by 
time as a matter of US prestige in international arena, it had become clear that 
America’s Iraq policy was collapsing (Tunç, 2004: 78-105).  As Perle emphasized: 
 
[T]here was a political dimension [for the war in Iraq], too. By 9/11, it was 
clear that American policy toward Iraq was collapsing. Support for sanctions 
was collapsing and could not be sustained. The sanctions were leaky, anyway. 
And [Saddam] would emerge out of sanctions as a hero in the whole Arab 
world” (Kosterlitz, 2003). 
  
Bush's awareness of this need to “handle” the Iraq problem also emerged in his 
comment to British Prime Minister Tony Blair during the latter’s visit to Washington 
a few days after 9/11.  As Bush prophesied, “Iraq, we keep for another day” (Daalder 
and Lindsay, 2003b: 105).  
Iraq, Bush thought, needed to be handled anyway. But the method was a 
matter of question. The CIA’s last analysis of the issue declared that it was 
impossible to topple Saddam's regime with covert operations. The only way to oust 
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Saddam was, CIA officials claimed in a briefing given to George W. Bush regarding 
Iraq, with a full-fledged military intervention (Woodward, 2004: 76).  Accordingly, 
Bush authorized the Pentagon to accelerate planning for possible military action 
against Iraq, only three months after 9/11 (See Hamilton, 2004 and also Daalder and 
Lindsay, 2003a: 123). 
Another decisive factor in going to war with Iraq was that neoconservative 
actors became part of a domestic political coalition.  They shared with aggressive 
realists, like Cheney and Rumsfeld, skepticism about the effectiveness of 
international institutions, treaties and diplomacy.  This informal alliance proved 
mutually reinforcing during policy-making discussions. In the case of Iraq, for 
instance, differences of opinion about postwar strategy and additional American 
commitment in the region faded into the background. Moreover, some moderate, 
internationalist Republicans, and even some Democrats, supported the war against 
Iraq – out of different motives than those of the conservative hardliners: they were 
hoping for an international coalition that would jointly deal with new threats. Such 
politicians hoped for backing from the United Nations, rather than from 
neoconservatives (Greve, 2004).  
Bush’s domestic political considerations might also have impacted his 
decision to effect radical change in his Administration’s foreign and security 
policies. Before September 11, Bush’s approval rating was quite poor. A slumping 
economy, the Enron scandal, growing anger in foreign capitals over his 
Administration’s unilateralism, and criticism of his month-long “working” vacation 
in Crawford combined to obscure his impressive success in engineering the passage 
of a $1.35 trillion tax cut. Correspondingly, early September polls in 2001 revealed 
that his approval rating had fallen to 51 percent. Only Gerald Ford, who alienated 
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many voters when he pardoned Richard Nixon, had experienced lower ratings during 
his first eight months in office.  David Frum, a Bush speechwriter at the time, 
probably exaggerated only slightly when he later wrote, “on September 10, 2001, 
George Bush was not on his way to a very successful presidency” (Daalder and 
Lindsay, 2003b: 78).  
Bush had already been known as an inexperienced president in terms of 
foreign policy and was criticized about his Administration’s “humble” (Greve, 2004) 
and unilateral foreign policy during his first eight months in office. 9/11 thus 
provided an opportunity for Bush to claim and pursue a more proactive foreign 
policy, attracting more domestic support at a time when US citizens needed a staunch 
leader to catch and bring to justice those responsible for 9/11's terrorist attacks. The 
other option available to Bush - to continue the ‘humble’ foreign policy of his pre-
9/11 tenure promised only to attract more citizen criticisms. Bush chose the more 
powerful alternative. 
 Bush was - surprisingly for many people, after his “bloody” first term - 
elected for a second presidential term in December, 2004. Bush’s appointments in his 
second term provide insight into what plans for foreign policy he incubated during 
his first term. Traditional realist Colin Powell no more stays in office after his 
isolation during the first term (Woodward, 2004: 82; see also Daalder and Lindsay, 
2003b: 57) and Rice, who has increasingly espoused the neocon-inclined Bush 
policies after September 11, was appointed to Powell’s post. Moreover, Bush 
nominated Paul Wolfowitz, a prominent neocon, as the president of the World Bank 
(BBC News, 2005) – a very significant institution capable of giving credits to 
developing countries. Such a post should be very pleasant for a neoconservative, 
whose prior aim is to spread democracy, especially at a time when a President, as 
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Bush, espoused policies to spread democracy in the world.  After his confirmation by 
the United States’ European partners, Wolfowitz became the new Head of the World 
Bank.  Similarly, Bush used his constitutional authority to appoint John Bolton, a 
prominent neoconservative, as the US’s Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations. This appointment offers an important indication of what sort of an 
engagement Bush plans to have with the UN.  
            Bush’s policies in his second term in office also shed light on the role of the 
neocons influence on his policies during his first term. The peaceful revolts in 
Georgia, the Ukraine and Kyrgzystan, during Bush’s presidency and the following 
replacements of democratic (read US-inclined) governments shortly afterwards, have 
created questions about possible CIA involvement in these revolts, as the CIA has 
received both greater authority and budget under Bush Junior's presidency.  
Irrespective of vague CIA involvement, however, what remains clear is that the US 
has been remarkably supportive of the “democratization” of these states by solely 
diplomatic means. It seems, today, the spread of democracy in the world, which is a 
neocon ideal, continues with the support of the second Bush Administration.  
 Second Bush Administration’s policies against Syria and Iran likely also 
indicate neocon influence on George W. Bush, as neocon proposals about a wide 
range of democratic transformations in the Middle East included Syria and Iran as 
the objects of attention following regime change in Iraq. Strong US pressure on Syria 
to withdraw its forces from Lebanon, after the assassination of Lebanon’s former 
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri on April 14, 2005, and similar US pressure on Iran not to 
use its nuclear program for weapons production, further indicate abiding neocon-
inclined influence within Bush Junior’s second term policies. During a meeting with 
his advisors for planning the war against Afghanistan on September 17, 2001, Bush 
 
 
84
declared “Let’s hit them hard,” and continued “[w]e want to signal this is a change 
from the past. We want to cause other countries like Syria and Iran to change their 
view” (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003a: 123). The second Bush Junior Administration’s 
continuation of a neocon-inclined foreign policy is important perhaps because it 
suggests what kind of foreign policy objectives Bush aimed to achieve in his first 
term.  
In sum, this thesis has evaluated the role of neocon ideas within the security 
policies of George W. Bush.  In fact, the foreign policy pursued by Bush after 
September 11, was the product of a complex interaction of material and ideational 
factors. With the least reduction it could achieve, this thesis has addressed two 
important constitutive factors of the political outcome of US foreign and security 
policies after 9/11: namely, neoconservative ideas and September 11 terrorist attacks, 
referring briefly some supplemental factors in this regard. A future analysis, 
incorporating investigation of Bush’s policies throughout two full terms, may offer 
better insight still into the role of neoconservatives within Bush’s presidencies. This 
thesis might be perceived as a preparatory work for such a broader analysis.  
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